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Statutes in Common Law Courts 
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski* 
The Supreme Court teaches that federal courts, unlike their counterparts in 
the states, are not general common law courts.  Nevertheless, a perennial point 
of contention among federal law scholars is whether and how a court’s common 
law powers affect its treatment of statutes.  Textualists point to federal courts’ 
lack of common law powers to reject purposivist statutory interpretation.  Critics 
of textualism challenge this characterization of federal courts’ powers, 
leveraging a more robust notion of the judicial power to support purposivist or 
dynamic interpretation.  This disagreement has become more important in recent 
years with the emergence of a refreshing movement in the theory of statutory 
interpretation.  While debate about federal statutory interpretation has settled 
into a holding pattern, scholars have begun to consider whether state courts 
should interpret statutes differently than federal courts and, if so, the 
implications of that fact for federal and general interpretation. 
This Article aspires to help theorize this emerging field as a whole while 
making progress on one of its most important parts, namely the question of the 
difference that common law powers make to statutory interpretation.  This 
inquiry takes us beyond the familiar moves in federal debates on interpretation.  
In turn, it suggests an interpretive method that defies both orthodox textualism 
and purposivism in that it may permit courts to extend statutory rules and 
principles by analogy while prohibiting courts from narrowing the scope of 
statutes in the name of purpose or equity.  Such a model accounts for state court 
practice at the intersection of statutes and common law that recent work on state 
court textualism neither confronts nor explains.  This model also informs federal 
theorization, both by challenging received wisdom about the relationship 
between common law and statutes and by offering guidance to federal courts at 
the intersection of statutes and pockets of federal common law. 
The framework this Article constructs to approach the common law 
question can also help organize the fledgling field of state–federal comparison 
more generally.  With this framework, we can begin to sort out the conflicting 
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and overlapping strands of argument already in the literature while also having 
a template for future inquiries.  At the same time, this framework can help us 
think about intersystemic interpretation with greater rigor—an advance that can 
aid state and federal jurisprudence alike. 
Introduction 
The revival of theory in statutory interpretation is one of the most 
significant events in American public law in the past three decades.1  The 
field continues to develop and its participants continue to disagree about how 
to read statutes.  Yet even among some of the partisans, there is a sense that 
where there was once wide-ranging debate, there is now a settled 
equilibrium, if not an argumentative rut.  “The guns in the statutory inter-
pretation wars,” one commentator muses, “are now largely silent.”2  Another, 
a critic of academic textualism, finds a “strong consensus on the interpretive 
enterprise that dwarfs any differences that remain.”3  Existing debate, on this 
account, obscures “just how thoroughly modern textualism has succeeded in 
dominating contemporary statutory interpretation.”4 
The dust from the Thirty Years’ statutory interpretation wars may have 
settled and, while textualism has not won an unconditional surrender in the 
Supreme Court, it appears to have gained substantial territory before its truce 
with purposivism.  If this is so, the scope of interpretive argument at the 
Supreme Court has narrowed in recent decades.  Thus, scholars that synthe-
size and criticize that jurisprudence on its own terms may have to focus on a 
correspondingly modest number of questions.  Even assuming that the 
Court’s equilibrium is stable, however, that agreement covers only a tip of 
the interpretive iceberg.  Statutory interpretation scholars have filled shelves 
of law reviews while focusing almost exclusively on the Supreme Court in 
general and on its exposition of federal public law in particular.5  This 
inquiry usually ignores the bulk of statutory interpretation cases in the United 
 
1. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 250–56 (1992) (chronicling the rise of interpretation theory 
in the 1980s). 
2. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 732 (2010). 
3. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
4. Id. at 36. 
5. For salutary exceptions, see Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of 
Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 318 (2005) (arguing that inferior courts have no sound basis 
for applying the Supreme Court’s doctrine of statutory stare decisis); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 
433 (2012) (describing institutional differences between different courts in the appellate hierarchy 
and arguing that these differences “justify a heterogeneous regime in which courts at different levels 
of the judicial hierarchy use somewhat different interpretive methods”); Daniel A. Farber & 
Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public 
Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 875 (1991) (exploring how modern common law judges, in light of the 
role of statutes as the primary source of law, should view their role in relationship to the 
legislature). 
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States, namely those resolved by state courts.6  The question of whether 
federal and state court interpretive methodology should run parallel is 
important, hardly obvious, and rarely pondered. 
Or at least that was so until very recently.  In the past few years, a small 
number of legal scholars have begun to examine theories of interpretation 
with a lens wider than that of federal review.7  This work, primarily by junior 
scholars, is the beginning of a fresh line of inquiry that promises insights not 
only on neglected matters of state court interpretation, but also on the 
received wisdom in federal interpretation and interpretive theory more 
generally.  Two questions are prominent in this fledgling literature.  First, 
whether state courts should interpret their statutes differently than how 
federal courts read federal statutes.8  Second, if methods diverge, how to 
interpret statutes across the borders of jurisdictions with different methods.9 
This Article pursues the first divergence question with hopes of also 
shedding light on both the second intersystemic question and federal 
interpretation more generally.  It does so by taking up an important but 
underexplored problem: whether a state court with general common law 
powers should approach statutes differently than a federal court that, in the 
post-Erie era,10 is understood to lack such powers.  This question will also 
serve as a platform for building a more general framework for considering 
the divergence question.  With this framework, we can begin to sort out the 
conflicting and overlapping strands of inquiry already in the literature while 
having a template for future inquiries.  At the same time, this framework can 
help us think about the intersystemic question with greater rigor—an advance 
that will aid state and federal jurisprudence alike.  In short, this Article 
aspires to help define and theorize a promising new line of inquiry as a whole 
while making progress on one of its more substantial parts. 
 
6. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS iv (2010) (noting that approximately 95% of all 
cases filed in the United States are filed in state court); see also Abbe R. Gluck, The States as 
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified 
Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, Laboratories] (“The vast majority 
of statutory interpretation theory is based on a strikingly small slice of American jurisprudence, the 
mere two percent of litigation that takes place in federal courts—and, really, only the less-than-one 
percent of that litigation that the U.S. Supreme Court decides.”). 
7. See, e.g., Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1750 (discussing modern statutory 
interpretation in several state courts of last resort). 
8. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 5, at 439 (identifying several institutional differences that 
“militate in favor of interpretive divergences across courts”). 
9. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and 
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1991–92 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic] 
(highlighting that federal and state courts do not consider whether they are required to apply one 
another’s methodology when interpreting each other’s statutes). 
10. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike 
state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and 
apply their own rules of decision.”). 
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Exploring the difference common law powers make in courts’ treatment 
of statutes takes the inquiry beyond the familiar moves in debates about 
federal statutory interpretation.  State courts assessing the interpretive 
implications of their common law powers should consider sources besides 
Supreme Court precedent on ordinary interpretation.  Indeed, perhaps the 
most instructive body of precedent on this question can be found not in the 
United States Reports, but in the high courts of commonwealth jurisdictions 
like the United Kingdom and Australia which, like American state courts, 
must reconcile their general common lawmaking powers with a superior 
legislature’s statutes.  Finally, common law courts may have to confront 
jurisprudential questions about the interpretation of statutes and precedent 
that federal courts arguably can avoid. 
All told, a plausible result of these inquiries is an interpretive method 
that defies both orthodox textualism and purposivism as we know it, a hybrid 
model that permits courts to extend statutory rules and principles by analogy 
while prohibiting courts from narrowing the scope of statutes in the name of 
nontextual purpose or equity.  This common law/parliamentary hybrid ac-
counts for state court practice at the intersection of statutes and common law 
that recent groundbreaking work on state court textualism neither confronts 
nor explains.  Such a model can also inform federal theorization, both by 
challenging received wisdom about the relationship between common law 
and statutes and by offering guidance to federal courts when statutes and 
enclaves of federal common law meet. 
I. Federal and State Statutory Interpretation 
To set the stage for the broader argument, this Part summarizes the state 
of play in both federal and state statutory interpretation theory.  In many 
respects, the state of scholarship in the two fields could not be more different.  
In the federal context, decades of sustained argument appear to have 
narrowed disagreement among scholars and judges to a smaller set of 
problems.  If the revival of statutory interpretation theory in federal courts 
has settled down to a new equilibrium, theorization about interpretation 
outside the federal context is just starting to stir.  This small but diverse body 
of work both hints at and calls out for a general framework for thinking about 
interpretation in state courts and across jurisdictions. 
A. Federal Statutory Interpretation and Faithful Agent Equilibrium 
Federal statutory interpretation theory is a natural baseline for 
comparison with the state context, if only because such work defines most of 
the conceptual space in which American courts and scholars operate.  A 
review of recent case law and much of the scholarly literature suggests that 
encapsulating this federal jurisprudence is easier now than it was twenty 
years ago.  A vigorous, wide-ranging debate between textualism and its 
critics appears to have stabilized and turned to a set of narrower, albeit 
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fundamental, questions about interpretation.  At the Supreme Court, the 
assumed framework in recent decades is one of faithful agency to Congress, 
a framework in significant part constructed on textualist terms.  Although the 
Court has not granted every item on the textualist wish list, the Court’s 
jurisprudence appears to reject strong purposivist or dynamic approaches to 
interpretation. 
If, as some have argued, “[t]he guns in the statutory interpretation wars 
are now largely silent,”11 it is fair to ask how they quieted so.  Professor John 
Manning’s recent history of interpretive theory tells a story of dialectic and 
synthesis between textualism and purposivism in the Supreme Court’s 
reading of statutes.12  Starting in the early 1980s, founding textualists 
emphasized empirical challenges to the use of legislative history and the 
coherence of invoking a legislative body’s “intent” or “purpose.”13  In 
response, textualism’s critics drew on public choice theory to defend a 
moderated use of legislative history and to shore up the cogency and 
reliability of appeals to congressional intent and purpose.14  At the same time, 
purposivists and intentionalists pointed out that textualists regularly relied on 
interpretive tools beyond the statutory text, such as canons of interpretation, 
common law understandings, and dictionaries.15  Textualism, according to 
these criticisms, was premised on bad political science and was internally 
contradictory in its use of external sources.16 
In response, Manning accedes that this criticism “clouded the cleanly 
intuitive appeal of the empirical claims” that early textualists made against 
legislative history, intent, and purpose.17  Manning also agrees that texts are 
not self-revealing and that textualists can, do, and should use some extrinsic 
sources.18  This is not because those extrinsic sources are authoritative, but 
because they are useful contextual evidence for identifying what a 
hypothetical legislator at the time of enactment would seek to convey to a 
 
11. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 732. 
12. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287 (2010) 
[hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation]. 
13. Id. at 1291–92. 
14. See id. at 1298–303 (discussing the responses of textualism’s critics—including Farber and 
Frickey’s specific critiques of textualists’ interest group theory and social choice theory—to the 
practical assumptions underlying textualism).  For a recent philosophical defense of collective, 
parliamentary intent, see generally Richard Ekins, The Intention of Parliament, 2010 PUB. L. 709. 
15. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 3, at 30–36 (praising textualism’s recognition that language 
only has meaning in context); see also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from 
Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 79–85 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] 
(discussing modern textualists’ use of extrastatutory context as a means of discerning the objective 
intent of a statutory text). 
16. See Molot, supra note 3, at 49–50 (explaining that when modern or aggressive textualists 
ignore a statute’s context, they risk being judicial activists and disregarding congressional intent). 
17. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1303. 
18. Id. at 1308. 
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reasonable reader of legal English.19  Finally, Manning accedes that when a 
text remains vague or ambiguous, textualists can justifiably make “rough 
estimates” of statutory purpose to resolve cases.20  On the other hand, he 
notes that purposivists not only use similar extrinsic sources to understand 
statutes, but in recent years have focused increasingly on statutory text and 
structure.21  Like textualists, “purposivists start—and most of the time end—
their inquiry with the semantic meaning of the text.”22  Given these 
similarities, a sharp contrast between textualism and its rivals is hard to see, 
and much recent scholarship searches for that very distinction.23 
On this question, Manning emphasizes nonempirical, constitutional 
arguments for textualism.  He posits a theoretically simpler textualism that 
adheres to a more modest and basic tenet about statutory interpretation: when 
the semantic meaning of a statutory text is clear to the reasonable reader, a 
court must honor that meaning even when doing so appears to conflict with a 
statute’s broader purpose or policy.24  This choice between semantic meaning 
and conflicting policy, Manning explains, is the basic question dividing 
textualists and purposivists.25  The textualist’s prioritization of semantic 
meaning over broader purpose is controversial.  Some purposivists call on 
academic textualists, who have “won” the interpretive “war” in the Supreme 
Court, to accept moderate deviations from this tenet, such as the canon 
against absurd interpretations.26  Others claim that this apparently modest 
 
19. See Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 79 (describing modern textualists’ belief that 
language is only intelligible in its context); see also John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2457 (2003) [hereinafter Manning, Absurdity Doctrine] (discussing modern 
textualism’s emphasis on understanding language in its social context). 
20. Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 84–85. 
21. Id. at 85. 
22. Id. at 87. 
23. Compare Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005) (observing that 
prior scholarship has exaggerated the difference between the goals of textualism and intentionalism 
while underappreciating their differing attitudes towards rules and standards), with John F. 
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005) (maintaining that textualists 
and intentionalists offer differing conceptions of legislative intent), and Caleb Nelson, A Response 
to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451 (2005) (reiterating that textualists and purposivists 
largely agree on the goals of interpretation); compare Molot, supra note 3 (rejecting the traditional 
line dividing textualists and purposivists and proposing a moderate version of textualism to appeal 
to both sides), with Manning, What Divides, supra note 15 (conceding that textualism and 
purposivism share more conceptual common ground than normally acknowledged but noting that 
textualism prioritizes semantic context while purposivism prioritizes policy context); see also Larry 
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free 
Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 982–84 (2004) (arguing that 
textualism is most plausibly understood as rule-restricted intentionalism). 
24. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1309–10; see also Manning, What Divides, 
supra note 15, at 76 (noting that textualists give semantic cues determinative weight even where 
conflicting evidence of policy exists). 
25. Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 91. 
26. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
117, 119 (2009) (citing Molot, supra note 3) (noting purposivists’ suggestions that textualists 
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tenet is textualism’s Achilles’ heel, a methodological weakness that will 
ultimately doom a theory that upholds increasingly absurd and outmoded 
interpretations.27 
Yet disagreement on this basic point stands out among a broader 
convergence in both the Supreme Court and much recent scholarship.28  
Manning argues persuasively that the Supreme Court has now settled at an 
equilibrium in which it has reduced, rather than eliminated, its use of 
legislative history while also increasing its attention to statutory text at the 
expense of broader purposive inquiry.29  Further, the disagreement at the 
Supreme Court concerns not whether the interpreter should be a faithful 
agent of Congress or a dynamic partner in governance, but whether 
Congress’s faithful agent should adhere to text or purpose when the two 
conflict.  Even the Court’s more purposivist opinions take pains to ground 
their interpretations in both semantic meaning and overarching policy.30  If 
there are any Calabresian judicial artists or metademocrats on the Court,31 
they are well-hidden. 
This is not to judge the merits of strong purposivist or dynamic statutory 
interpretation, but to note that the Court does not approach statutes on those 
terms, or at least does not do so explicitly.  If anything, Manning’s 
assessment might understate textualism’s recent strides at the Supreme 
Court.  The last Court majority to rely on Church of the Holy Trinity v. 
United States32—the case famous for holding that a statute’s literal textual 
meaning must yield in the face of absurd results—predates the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.33  The practice of implying private rights of action to effectuate 
 
should cease to advocate for an “aggressive textualism” and instead embrace the moderate 
approaches on which scholars and judges have agreed). 
27. Id. at 121–22 (arguing that textualists cannot accept the more moderate approaches 
suggested by accommodationists such as Professors Molot and Nelson “without ceasing to be 
textualists”). 
28. But see id. at 119–20 (contrasting the view—shared by Professors Molot and Nelson—that 
textualism and intentionalism have generally converged, with his own position that textualists’ 
adherence to a formalist axiom ensures that “their war with other methods can never cease”). 
29. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1307; id. at 1308 (citing Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568–69 (2005) as exemplifying the new equilibrium). 
30. Id. at 1313 n.117 (citing Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 94–99 
(2007) and Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 591 (2004)). 
31. See generally Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in 
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995) (identifying a new “metademocratic” 
conception of statutory interpretation whereby courts assign meaning to contested statutory terms 
via interpretive rules designed to produce democratizing effects); Robert Weisberg, The 
Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983) 
(characterizing Calabresi’s activist conception of judges as artists capable of recasting the law). 
32. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
33. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (citing Church of the Holy 
Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459).  The Court has, however, since invoked the absurdity doctrine to depart 
from textual meaning.  See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (rejecting 
the government’s novel reading of § 692 of the Line Item Veto Act because acceptance of such an 
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uncodified legislative intent and promote overarching legislative purposes 
has fared only slightly better.34  In fact, one commentator read a recent 
Supreme Court opinion as signaling the complete victory of the new 
textualism over strong purposivism.35  In Astrue v. Ratliff,36 the Court gave 
force to the clear semantic meaning of a term in a fee-shifting statute despite 
arguments—grounded in legislative findings and history—that: (i) Congress 
would have preferred a different result had it considered that particular 
problem; and (ii) that the semantic meaning undercut the statute’s remedial 
purpose.37  Justice Sotomayor pressed these points in a concurring opinion 
joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsberg, but all three joined Justice 
Thomas’s opinion of the Court in full because the textual analysis 
“compell[ed] the conclusion.”38 
In other words, nine Justices, including the last one to invoke Church of 
the Holy Trinity,39 chose objective semantic meaning gleaned from text, 
structure, and linguistic canons over policy inferences and an imaginative 
reconstruction of what the enacting legislators would have wanted had they 
considered the issue.40  Thus, when faced with the choice between semantic 
meaning and statutory purpose—Manning’s dividing line between textualism 
and purposivism—the Court chose semantic meaning unanimously.  In 1991, 
a similar question produced a foundational textualist decision, but in a 5–4 
 
interpretation would “produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have 
intended”). 
34. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (“The judicial task is to interpret 
the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private 
right but also a private remedy.”); cf. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–86 (2002) 
(foreclosing the plaintiff’s action for violation of a federal statute because the statute did not 
manifest an unambiguous intent to create individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
35. Frederick Liu, Astrue v. Ratliff and the Death of Strong Purposivism, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 167, 173 (2011) (“Interpretive consensus on the Supreme Court is not impossible. . . .  
If Ratliff is any indication, strong purposivism is dead . . . .”). 
36. 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). 
37. Id. at 2530–31 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
38. Id. at 2529–30. 
39. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 n.3 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing Church of the Holy Trinity to support his position that a literal reading of 
statutory text should give way when Congress’s intent as to the precise issue before the Court is 
clear). 
40. See Liu, supra note 35, at 170 (identifying a legislator’s subjective intent as one of two 
kinds of “intent” a court should look for when interpreting statutes).  But see Richard A. Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 
(1983) (arguing that the purposive approach of “imaginative reconstruction” is a model of faithful 
agency superior to textualism). 
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split with three separate dissents.41  In Astrue, those with misgivings saw no 
option but appeal to Congress for textual amendment.42 
B. State Court Statutory Interpretation 
If federal disputes about statutory interpretation have stabilized, serious 
scholarship about interpretation in the state context has only just begun.  This 
subpart reviews and synthesizes scholarship on statutory interpretation in 
state courts.  The subpart focuses on the questions of whether state court 
interpretation should differ from federal court interpretation and the 
consequent question of whether interpretive method should travel with a 
statute across jurisdictional bounds.  This growing body of scholarship both 
hints at and calls out for a more general framework for thinking about 
interpretation in state courts and across jurisdictions. 
1. The Jurists.—Until recently, most modern theory on state statutory 
interpretation came via state judges’ speeches later reprinted in the host 
institutions’ law reviews.  These works flag potential points of difference 
between state and federal court interpretation, such as state courts’ general 
common law powers and the relevant similarities and differences in state and 
federal constitutional structures.  These arguments, however, raise as many 
questions as they answer about state court interpretation. 
The leading example of this genre is a lecture by Judith Kaye as chief 
judge of the New York Court of Appeals.43  The touchstone of her argument 
for state court divergence is the fact that state courts “are the keepers of the 
common law.”44  Even in an age of statutes, state courts, unlike federal courts 
of limited jurisdiction, retain general common law powers.45  Because of this, 
Judge Kaye argues, state law is a complex tapestry of common law and 
statute, making the court an interlocutor with the legislature, not just a 
passive interpreter of statutory commands.46  This “common-law method 
compels courts” to depart from a statute’s plain meaning when doing so leads 
 
41. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101–03 (1991) (holding, based on 
plain language, that a federal statute conveyed no authority to shift expert fees, but with Justices 
Marshall and Stevens dissenting on the grounds that statutory interpretation should also involve 
extratextual considerations). 
42. See Astrue, 130 S. Ct. at 2533 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Bartlett v. Strickland, 
556 U.S. 1, 44 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (“While I join the Court’s opinion and agree with 
its textual analysis, the foregoing persuades me that the practical effect of our decision ‘severely 
undermines the [statute’s] estimable aim . . . .  The Legislature has just cause to clarify beyond 
debate’ whether this effect is one it actually intends.”). 
43. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading 
Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
44. Id. at 6. 
45. Id. at 20 (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) and Tex. Indus., 
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–42 (1981)). 
46. See id. at 20–26 (describing the state legislative/judicial dialogue and surveying instances of 
legislative–judicial give-and-take). 
488 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:479 
 
 
to absurd results.47  To bring this back to Manning’s dichotomy, Kaye argues 
that her court’s common law powers and tradition allow it to choose broader 
purpose over semantic meaning when the two conflict. 
Judge Kaye does not point to specific examples on how a state and 
federal court might rule differently when faced with a similar statutory 
problem.48  That said, her emphasis on the legitimacy of the state court’s role 
in law and policy development suggests that her comparative target is federal 
textualism.49  It is also not clear that she believes federal courts are barred 
from applying the common law method in statutory interpretation.  If 
anything, her approving citations to federal scholars like William Eskridge, 
Daniel Farber, and Philip Frickey suggest the contrary.50  In this light, a state 
court’s common law powers (as opposed to method) may be a sufficient and 
additional justification for the dialogic purposivism she advances, but not a 
necessary feature.51 
Connecticut State Supreme Court Justice Ellen A. Peters also addresses 
state statutory interpretation in her work distinguishing the state and federal 
traditions of separation of powers.52  As with Judge Kaye, Justice Peters 
invokes the state court’s common law powers, claiming them as an 
interpretive resource that federal courts lack.53  Again like Judge Kaye, 
Justice Peters also is ambivalent on whether this cashes out in any 
methodological differences for state and federal judges facing similar 
statutory problems.  She claims that “[m]ost state court judges, like most 
federal judges,” hold the “mainstream view” rejecting federal textualism.54  
Although Peters notes other differences in the separation of powers in the 
states, she does not offer a strong link between them and an approach to 
statutory interpretation.55 
 
47. Id. at 26. 
48. She does note, however, that state courts have less access to legislative history than federal 
courts.  Id. at 29–30.  This difference appears to have narrowed in recent years.  Gluck, 
Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1829 n.301, 1859 n.398. 
49. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 9–11 (rejecting as a canard criticism of “judicial activism”). 
50. For example, Kaye cites Eskridge alone twelve times. Id. at 19 nn.106–08, 22 n.119, 23 
n.124, 29 n.165, 30 n.167, 33 n.182, 34 n.185. 
51. See Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute in New York: A Response to Judge Kaye and Some 
More, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85, 86–87 (1999) (arguing that both federal and state courts use the 
“common law” method of interpretation Kaye describes). 
52. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State 
Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543 (1997). 
53. Id. at 1555–56. 
54. Id. at 1555. 
55. See id. at 1555–64 (detailing various differences between federal and state separation of 
powers and giving examples of their effect on statutory construction and on the day-to-day 
functioning of state courts, but failing to give a definitive link); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson & 
Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1081–82, 1085 (1991) (observing that some state supreme courts offer 
advisory opinions, some state judges sit on law reform committees, and some informally lobby 
legislators); cf. Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: 
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 117, 128 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (finding “no 
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Michigan Supreme Court Justice Robert Young, Jr., by contrast, 
embraces federal-style textualism and criticizes Judge Kaye’s approach to 
statutory interpretation.56  He argues that statutory interpretation is “not a 
branch of common-law exegesis” because the separation of powers requires 
the court to respect the legislature’s expressed intent.57  Like many federal 
textualists, Young would employ semantic canons, consult a limited set of 
nontextual sources, be suspicious of legislative history, and look beyond 
expressed intent only when a statute is ambiguous.58  In doing so, he rejects 
the absurdity doctrine and notes that the Michigan Supreme Court only 
invokes particularly reliable forms of legislative history.59 
Justice Young’s approach tracks the faithful-agent equilibrium 
identified in federal practice.60  Although he discusses a substantial amount 
of textualist Michigan precedent, he does not distinguish the federal and state 
contexts at the level of principle.  His embrace of textualism on grounds that 
“ours is a constitutional republic” does not specifically refer to the 
constitution of either Michigan or the United States.61  Presumably, the 
notions of legislative supremacy and separation of powers in Michigan that 
underwrite Justice Young’s theory of statutory interpretation are no different 
than their federal counterparts, resulting in a unified methodology. 
2. The Scholars.—The judges’ writings offer kernels of arguments 
about federal–state divergence: the significance of state courts’ general 
common law powers; the significance of distinct separation of powers 
arrangements; and, by contrast, the potential irrelevance of common law 
powers in the face of federal–state parallels in the judicial role and 
constitutional structure.  According to recent accounts of litigated cases, 
moreover, many state judges assume that federal law and scholarship on 
 
insurmountable legal obstacles to useful interaction between judges and legislators in the 
development of good policies” if there are “clear distinctions as to whether a judge speaks for the 
institutional concerns of the judicial branch, for the personal interests of judges as a group, or as an 
individual citizen”). 
56. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist Confronts Justice Brennan’s School of 
Judicial Philosophy, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 263, 268–69 (2008) (criticizing Judge Kaye’s 
judicial philosophy, which views judges as having a “responsibility” to reshape society and to 
interpret statutes based on “perception[s] of the ‘common good,’” as an “unfortunately . . . 
commonplace” notion); see also Lane, supra note 51, at 86–87 (challenging Judge Kaye’s 
description of common law interpretive methods because she limits its reach to state courts and 
arguing instead that differences in interpretive methods do not align by jurisdiction but rather by 
“individual judicial sensibilities”). 
57. Young, supra note 56, at 280. 
58. Id. at 280–82. 
59. Id. at 281–82. 
60. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, has not explicitly repudiated the absurdity 
doctrine, and Young’s parsimony in identifying ambiguity may be stricter than current Michigan 
Supreme Court practice.  See id. (finding statutes ambiguous if their provisions are in irreconcilable 
conflict or if competing interpretations are in equipoise). 
61. Id. at 280. 
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statutory interpretation translate well to the state context.62  Absent further 
judicial development, it falls to scholars to explore questions of comparative 
methodology.  Yet even when the explosion of writing about statutory 
interpretation was at its apex, few considered such questions.63  Even Robert 
Summers, one of the greatest comparativists in statutory interpretation, 
focused almost exclusively on Supreme Court decisions for his chapter on 
American methodology in a volume on comparative statutory inter-
pretation.64 
In the past five years, however, a handful of scholars began to take state 
interpretive methodology seriously.  The earliest work hewed close to federal 
matters.  Professor Alex Long, for example, considered interpretation of state 
discrimination statutes that parallel federal law.65  He concluded that interests 
of judicial integrity, legislative efficiency, and respect for legislative intent 
recommend that state courts presumptively follow federal interpretations.66  
Professor Anthony J. Bellia then studied state court interpretations of federal 
statutes in the post-Ratification era.67  There, Bellia asked whether state 
courts applied the doctrine known as the “equity of the statute” when 
interpreting federal statutes.68  This common law doctrine allows courts to 
depart from a statute’s clear text in light of the reason or “equity” of the 
legislation—either by extending the statute’s applicability beyond its scope 
but within its purpose or by restricting the scope of a statute when the text 
applies to a matter but the purpose does not.69  Bellia found state courts 
invoking the doctrine for state statutes while not equitably interpreting 
 
62. See Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1858 (observing that state courts “do not see 
institutional differences as substantial enough to pose barriers to the exchange of theory” between 
state and federal interpretive tools). 
63. William Popkin is an early exception.  Yet in both his general theorizing and his close study 
of a state court’s opinions, his work assumes that state and federal cases are interchangeable for 
purposes of his theoretical analysis.  See William D. Popkin, Statutory Interpretation in State 
Courts—A Study of Indiana Opinions, 24 IND. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1991) (arguing that “[t]wo of 
the issues prominent in contemporary literature [on statutory interpretation] can be profitably 
explored in the context of state cases”).  See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: 
THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999) (providing a historical 
analysis of the evolution of statutory interpretation at the state and federal levels).  This may be true, 
but, as we will see later, not obviously so. 
64. Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the United States, in INTERPRETING 
STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 407, 407 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 
1991). 
65. Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of State 
and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 475–76 (2006). 
66. Id. at 476. 
67. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1529–52 (2006) (analyzing the practices of state courts in interpreting 
federal statutes from 1789 to 1820). 
68. Id. at 1547. 
69. Id. at 1508–09; see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29–36 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (summarizing the 
origins and scope of the doctrine in English courts). 
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federal statutes.70  He ascribed this difference to the Supremacy Clause’s 
limitation on state courts’ federal lawmaking and its requirement of 
uniformity in federal law.71  Equitable interpretation, Bellia explained, would 
contravene both requirements in the federal context.72 
Professor Abbe Gluck has recently taken up the question of state court 
interpretation more generally.  In her first work, Gluck studied interpretation 
in five states and identified a three-step interpretive approach she calls 
“modified textualism”—a method she claims is the controlling interpretative 
approach in the states studied.73  Gluck finds this coalescence important 
because it shows that, unlike the conclusions put forward by many federal 
commentators, courts can agree on an interpretive method and treat it as a 
binding framework, even in the face of legislation to the contrary.74  This 
consensus, Gluck argues, indicates that statutory methodology can itself be a 
form of law.75  Gluck’s second work asks whether interpretive methodology 
travels with a statute across jurisdictional lines.76  Gluck finds an erratic 
federal practice, in which federal courts reading state statutes often ignore 
state interpretive methods.77  She argues that, under Erie, a federal court 
interpreting a state statute should apply the state’s method—such as modified 
textualism—if the state’s courts consider that approach to be binding law.78 
Finally, Professors Aaron-Andrew Bruhl and Ethan Leib have examined 
the implications of one notable difference between state and federal courts: 
the fact that most state court judges are elected.79  They argue that elections 
should not matter in cases without valence in popular opinion or in cases 
easily resolved by traditional tools of interpretation.80  By contrast, electoral 
accountability and its accompanying political knowledge may justify a more 
active judicial role interpreting legislation that (a) reflects stale popular 
 
70. Bellia, supra note 67, at 1506–07. Bellia also notes that equitable interpretation of state 
statutes was increasingly less favorable as courts began to focus on legislative intent.  Id. at 1507. 
71. Id. at 1548–52. 
72. Id. at 1552. 
73. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1758.  “Modified textualism” looks first to text, then 
legislative history, and then substantive canons.  A court proceeds to the next step only if the prior 
leaves the question unresolved.  Id. 
74. See id. at 1787–91 (describing the Texas textualist courts’ defiance of legislated rules of 
interpretation). 
75. See id. at 1757–58 (arguing that state court practice “challenge[s] the prevailing theoretical 
resistance to [methodological consistency] and highlight[s] the possibility that [courts] might be 
receptive to consistent methodological frameworks”); id. at 1862 (“Is methodology ‘law’?  The 
Supreme Court does not act as if it is.  The state courts studied here appear to conclude otherwise.”). 
76. Gluck, Intersystemic, supra note 9, at 1901. 
77. Id. at 1905. 
78. See id. at 1990–91 (arguing that the underpinnings of Erie point to the conclusion that state 
statutory questions should be decided by federal courts under state interpretive methodology or else 
deviations should be justified). 
79. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1215 (2012). 
80. Id. at 1255–57. 
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preferences, (b) reflects special interests rather than popular preferences, or 
(c) violates minority rights in ways that are otherwise constitutional.81  In this 
respect, Bruhl and Leib suggest that state courts are better situated than 
federal courts to engage in statutory updating of the kind advocated by some 
federal scholars.82 
3. Moving Forward.—Widening the focus beyond the federal context 
also reveals what I call the divergence question: whether state courts should 
read their statutes as federal courts read statutes.  Some scholarship has 
begun to explore parts of this large question, but even though these initial 
efforts are few, they adopt a dizzying array of lenses.  State court judges, for 
example, point to common law powers and constitutional structure as 
possible points of departure.83  Similarly, although Bellia examined state 
interpretation for its implications on federal practice, his emphasis on 
constitutional norms suggests that interpretation of state statutes could be 
distinct due to differences in federal and state constitutional structures.84  
Long’s work focused only on discrimination statutes tracking federal law, but 
his analysis of the benefits of uniform interpretation may point to a broader 
argument about the desirability of interpretive divergence or convergence in 
general.85  In particular, he points to complying with legislative preferences, 
promoting legislative efficiency, and preserving the reputation of the state 
judiciaries and moral authority of the Supreme Court.86  Bruhl and Leib’s 
argument for the difference elections make in state interpretation considers 
other variables, such as institutional competence, democratic legitimacy, and 
pragmatic considerations.87  It is fair, even at this early point, to ask how 
these varying approaches interrelate and what they might be missing. 
This possibility of divergence raises the second matter—the 
intersystemic question—about how to negotiate interpretation of statutes 
across jurisdictional lines.  Gluck focuses on this second question, but shows 
ambivalence about the first.  Both of her major works depend on interpretive 
divergence: The state court textualism she first identifies is “new” and 
“modified” compared to federal textualism.88  The Erie question in statutory 
interpretation she addresses in her second work is most pressing only if state 
and federal courts adopt different methodologies—otherwise a federal court 
facing an open question of state statutory law would get to work much as it 
 
81. Id. at 1258–67. 
82. Id. 
83. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 20–26; Peters, supra note 52, at 1555–56. 
84. Bellia, supra note 67, at 1548–52 (discussing the effect the Supremacy Clause has on state 
interpretations of federal statutes). 
85. See Long, supra note 65, at 476 (arguing for a presumption towards uniform construction 
when interpreting similar statutory language). 
86. Id. at 507. 
87. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1223–30. 
88. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1758. 
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would in ordinary course.  Yet sometimes Gluck identifies potential sources 
of state–federal divergence only to downplay their relevance compared to 
cross-jurisdictional similarities.89  The source of this tension, it seems, is a 
desire to establish the relevance of state court practice to the federal context 
and vice versa.90  Gluck’s claim of relevance seems correct, though it may 
hold even if there are substantial differences in the two contexts. 
While Gluck’s recognition of state–federal divergence does not require 
her to explain or justify it, this gap in the analysis may weaken confidence in 
the broader lessons she draws about interpretation more generally.  Knowing 
whether and why state court interpretation should diverge from federal 
interpretation can shed light on whether interpretative method is in fact 
“law,” what kind of “law” it is, and whether other tribunals are bound to 
respect it.91  For example, Gluck’s invocation of Erie treats interpretive 
method as a kind of positive, judge-made state law.92  This understanding, 
however plausible, conflicts with practice in the very courts she studies.93  
These courts, as Gluck notes, repeatedly resist statutes that attempt to dictate 
interpretive methods to courts.94  Aside from lawless intransigence, such 
resistance could suggest that courts treat interpretive method not as 
displaceable common law in the positivistic sense, but rather as a form of 
constitutional law.95  Or it may suggest a belief that methods of interpreting 
statutes cannot be legislated any more effectively than the methods for 
understanding ordinary English.96  These options—and their underlying rea-
sons for interpretive divergence or convergence—may lead to very different 
answers to the intersystemic question. 
This Article seeks to make progress on the divergence question while 
also shedding light on the intersystemic question.  It does so by addressing a 
 
89. See, e.g., id. at 1858–59 (“I do not wish to understate the extent of potential intersystemic 
differences . . . .  But there are at least two reasons why the states seem right not to allow these 
differences to prevent comparisons . . . .  First, the most often noted differences between state and 
federal governments do not seem to be doing much work here.”). 
90. See id. at 1861 (“[I]nstitutional differences should not be used as a reason to discount the 
relevance of state court legisprudence for federal statutory interpretation . . . .”). 
91. See id. at 1862 n.409 (explaining that discovery of state methodology raises the related 
reverse-Erie questions she addresses in the second part of her project). 
92. See, e.g., Gluck, Intersystemic, supra note 9, at 1990 (observing that if federal courts apply 
state methodology, “it should be because . . . a sovereign’s court chooses to apply them, not because 
they are ready to be plucked from the sky”). 
93. See Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1862 (“Is methodology ‘law’? . . .  The state 
courts studied here appear to conclude otherwise.”). 
94. Id. at 1755–56, 1785–98. 
95. Such a result might also trigger an Erie-like rule for federal courts.  But see Bruhl & Leib, 
supra note 79, at 1268–69 (noting that the challenges of “crossover” interpretation possibly could 
“generate good reasons to reject interpretive divergence”). 
96. Cf. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory 
Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 100 (2003) (“[I]f the goal 
is to understand the intentions of authors and speakers, one cannot be artificially constrained by 
fixed meanings or rules.”). 
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noted but underexplored aspect of the divergence question—the effect a state 
court’s common law powers may have on its interpretation of statutes.  As 
with judicial elections, these general common law powers may distinguish 
state courts from their federal counterparts.  Unlike judicial elections, exist-
ing scholarship does not address the effects of these powers on state courts in 
a systemic fashion.  The following analysis introduces the prospect of 
interpretive divergence due to a court’s common law powers. 
II. Approaching Statutes as “Keepers of the Common Law” 
A state court’s broad common law powers offer an intriguing point of 
comparison.  At the threshold, analyzing the effect of state courts’ common 
law powers may mitigate the dangers of comparing state courts in gross.  
Nearly every state court understands itself to possess some common law 
power, even after substantial movements for codification.97  Courts may have 
different understandings about the nature of the common law and its 
interaction with statutes,98 but at least here we have a feature that cuts across 
almost all states.  Furthermore, the fact that state courts are “keepers of the 
common law,” as Judge Kaye notes, offers a substantial, systemic contrast 
with the federal system.99  Even many who accept the legitimacy of federal 
common law understand it to exist in limited enclaves, compared to the more 
expansive common law powers of state courts.100 
This Part lays out a prima facie case for why a state court’s broader 
common law powers could justify a different approach to statutes than in 
federal courts.  For a comparative baseline, I will assume federal courts 
incline toward textualism, a possible oversimplification that nevertheless 
captures the thrust of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the past 
decade.101  So put, the primary question is whether state courts have more 
flexibility in their treatment of their statutes than federal-style textualism 
affords.  This Part draws on state court commentary and on broader theories 
of statutory interpretation to make a case for why that should be so. 
 
97. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 6 (highlighting the integral role the common law plays in 
decision making at the state court level).  A possible exception is Louisiana, whose civil law 
tradition separates it from other common law jurisdictions, though the practical difference of its 
civil law frame is contested.  See J.-R. Trahan, The Continuing Influence of le Droit Civil and el 
Derecho Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1053–55 (2003) (chronicling 
the purported decline of the civil law system in Louisiana and subsequent attempts by the Louisiana 
legislature and law schools to reverse the trend in the mid-twentieth century). 
98. For a fascinating discussion on this, see Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1126–27 & nn.88–90 (2011). 
99. Kaye, supra note 43, at 6. 
100. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 2, at 758–59 (“The relatively freewheeling era of federal 
judicial lawmaking (akin to that of a state common law court) to ‘fill in the gaps’ in a federal 
statutory regime . . . is long gone.  Most writers now posit a narrower sphere for judge-made 
common law.” (footnote omitted)). 
101. See supra subpart I(A). 
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A. The Importance of Common Law Powers 
State jurists like Judge Kaye and Justice Peters who seek to separate 
state court statutory interpretation from federal textualism refer to the 
“common law” nature of their courts.102  The state jurists’ invocation of the 
“common law” is a broad one and it pays to winnow down that appellation to 
see what most plausibly distinguishes state and federal practice. 
For example, Judge Kaye notes that state statutes codify common law 
causes of action and abrogate common law doctrines.103  Federal legislation, 
however, also incorporates common law concepts and textualists have no 
problem reading such statutes in that light.104  Federal statutes also abrogate 
judicial decisions at the intersection of common and statutory law.105  As 
Lilly Ledbetter’s experience attests, Kaye’s reliance on the fact that the “state 
legislative/judicial relationship often takes the form of an open dialogue”106 
is also not a significant ground for distinguishing state and federal practice.107  
The same holds for Kaye’s emphasis of provisions of state statutes that are 
often unclear and require judicial elaboration.108  Proponents of both 
expansive and restrictive approaches to federal common law regard this 
interpretive leeway as a kind of common law, and a legitimate form at that.109  
 
102. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 6 (describing state courts as the “keepers of the common 
law”); Peters, supra note 52, at 1155–56 (contrasting the large body of common law available to 
assist state courts in statutory construction with the much smaller amount of available federal 
common law). 
103. Kaye, supra note 43, at 20–21. 
104. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–15 (2009) 
(reading CERCLA liability apportionment in light of common law tort principles); see also Frank 
Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1913, 1913–14 
(1999) (reading the common law defense of necessity into a criminal statute silent on that matter); 
John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1648, 1656 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Deriving Rules] (discussing textualists’ application 
of common law principles and terminology when construing a statute); Caleb Nelson, The 
Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 521–25 (2006) (cataloging the incorporation 
of common law concepts in the interpretation of statutes). 
105. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (describing the 
congressional override of a decision holding that a statute abrogated the common law distinction 
between employees and independent contractors). 
106. Kaye, supra note 43, at 23. 
107. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (asking Congress to override the majority’s interpretation); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (overriding Ledbetter because of its impairment of statutory 
protections); see also Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2533 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(calling on Congress to clarify its statutory language). 
108. Kaye, supra note 43, at 27–29, 32–34. 
109. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) 
(“[Sometimes a] statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common 
law . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
34–35 (1985) (discussing how the Supreme Court has sometimes ignored evidence of specific 
intention when construing vague statutory or constitutional provisions); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. 
Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 331–32 (1980) 
(concluding that a court serves the same function when engaging in statutory interpretation as it 
does when acting in a common law capacity). 
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Kaye also observes that challenging questions of statutory interpretation may 
require degrees of lawyerly skill, judgment, and creativity equal to those 
required for judging the arc of common law precedent.110  Yet modern 
textualists do not claim that each statutory provision has a clear meaning.111  
To be sure, some textualists see less interpretive uncertainty than others, but 
they also advocate deference to administrative interpretation of unclear 
statutes because agencies are better equipped to make law through such 
decisions.112  This gap-filling form of “common law” arising out of statutory 
vagueness or ambiguity does not brightly distinguish state and federal 
interpretation. 
A more plausible point of common law differentiation is a state court’s 
broad power to create and change law in areas where the legislature has not 
spoken at all, as opposed to having spoken unclearly.113  Federal courts are 
less frequently seen creating common law actions, abandoning contributory 
negligence in favor of comparative fault,114 newly recognizing living wills,115 
or updating common law rules in light of scientific advances.116  By contrast, 
state courts, as Judge Kaye notes, can do so on their own initiative when the 
 
110. Kaye, supra note 43, at 27–29. 
111. See Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (“An ambiguous legal rule does not have a single ‘right’ meaning; there is a range 
of possible meanings; the selection from the range is an act of policymaking.”); Manning, What 
Divides, supra note 15, at 75 (observing that because modern textualists understand that the 
meaning of statutory language is dependent on context, they realize that the distinction between 
statutory text and congressional purpose is not always clear); Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra 
note 19, at 2408 (noting that textualists acknowledge that all statutory language is at least somewhat 
open-ended). 
112. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing for broad deference to the interpretations of the administrative agency charged with 
enforcing the statute); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006) (contending that the legal system is at its best when 
the interpretation of an ambiguous statute is left to an administrative agency). 
113. This argument assumes that state constitutions vest in or impliedly reserve for the judiciary 
general common law powers.  Common law powers in many states might be understood as 
legislative grants via reception statutes that incorporate common law not inconsistent with state law.  
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.04.010 (West 2005).  This might limit a court’s prerogative.  
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 346 (1992) (citing 
reception statutes as legislative justification for state common law).  Yet courts often treated these 
statutes as merely declaratory of existing judicial powers.  See Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An 
Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 804 (1951) (noting that “where 
the passage of a reception statute came later in the development of a state or territory, it was deemed 
to be declaratory of existing law”). 
114. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 21 (discussing the judicial adoption of comparative fault by 
state courts).  The Supreme Court will, however, make such changes in enclaves of federal common 
law, such as admiralty jurisdiction.  See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 
(1975) (abandoning the “divided damages” rule in admiralty jurisdiction in favor of comparative 
fault). 
115. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 25 (noting New York Court of Appeals’ willingness to 
recognize the concept of a living will without legislative action). 
116. See id. (referencing the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s decision to overrule the 
common law “year and a day” rule in homicide prosecutions). 
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legislature has not acted.117  It is this prerogative form of common 
lawmaking—as opposed to delegated lawmaking power—that raises the 
most substantial difference between the common law powers of state and 
federal courts.118  Accordingly, Judge Kaye claims that this prerogative also 
allows state courts to work with statutes in a nontextualist fashion.  She 
claims that sometimes the “common-law method” requires “plain meaning” 
to yield to “common-sense and substantial justice.”119  By contrast, federal 
textualists reject purposive or equitable interpretation.  Similarly, advocates 
of common law differentiation will apply a statute beyond the fair 
construction of its textual terms when doing so comports with the purpose of 
the statute.120  This filling of the casus omissus—treating an omitted statutory 
subject as included by analogy121—conflicts with the federal textualist’s 
commitment to respecting the limits to which the legislature chose to pursue 
a given end.122 
The challenging question, however, is how a court’s freestanding 
common law prerogative changes the way in which that court should read or 
use statutes.  Absent more argument about how to understand and integrate 
common law and statutes, it is not clear how judicial power to expound 
common law amid statutory silence also entails power to expand or contract 
legislative handiwork.123  The task then, is to identify arguments that support 
the intuition that common law powers affect interpretive method.  The 
following subparts begin that exploration. 
 
117. Id. 
118. See Merrill, supra note 113, at 347 (arguing that state reception statutes confer broad 
prerogative/common lawmaking powers on state courts). 
119. Kaye, supra note 43, at 26. 
120. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 31 (quoting Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common 
Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 405 (1968) [hereinafter Traynor, Statutes Revolving]) 
(hypothesizing a situation where a judge might deem it proper to extend a statutorily created right or 
duty to a person not expressly covered by the language of the statute when the extension falls in line 
with the purpose of the statute). 
121. See Derek Auchie, The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule, 25 STATUTE L. 
REV. 40, 41–42 (2004) (discussing the casus omissus rule’s gap-filling role); Hans W. Baade, The 
Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 45, 46 
(1994) (summarizing the history and development of the differing views of the casus omissus in 
civil law and common law systems). 
122. See Easterbrook, supra note 109, at 544 (proposing a framework wherein the domain of a 
statute should only extend to cases contemplated by the statute’s framers); Manning, Second-
Generation, supra note 12, at 1316 (asserting that textualists believe that judges should “respect the 
level of generality at which the legislature expresses its policies”); cf. Auchie, supra note 121, at 42 
(explaining that the rule against statutory analogy in England “finds its roots in the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty”). 
123. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 370 (1981) 
(stating that a court’s power to make law when the legislature has been silent does not imply a 
similar ability to alter statutes). 
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B. Statutory Interpretation and the Constitution 
Knowing the tenets of theories like textualism and purposivism is 
necessary for thinking about statutory interpretation beyond the Supreme 
Court.  Yet in asking whether state and federal methods should diverge, it 
helps to consider reasons for adopting any particular approach.  A first lens 
for viewing the question of interpretive choice focuses on the interpreter’s 
role in the constitutional regime.124  A constitution may impose duties or 
limitations on interpreters that affect their approach to legal texts.125  A 
constitution could, for example, require or prohibit the judiciary from 
considering purpose in the event of semantic textual clarity.126  Attempts to 
derive rules of statutory interpretation from the constitution play a prominent 
part in federal scholarship and can serve as starting points for analysis in the 
state context.127  In fact, constitutional textualists have left open the possibil-
ity that arguments for federal textualism may not carry over to the state 
context.128  This subpart picks up that thread to explain how some constitu-
tional arguments in the federal context weaken the case for textualism in 
state courts when one considers common law powers.129 
 
124. See Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) 
(“Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law.”); Adrian 
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 76 (2000) (coining the handy phrase: 
“interpretive choice”).  One must also interpret the constitution to derive norms for interpreting 
statutes.  The question of interpretive choice in the constitutional context is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but some argue that the method might differ in constitutional and statutory contexts.  See 
Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1, 4–5 (2004) (summarizing the factors that justify a divergence in interpretive methods). 
125. Here I focus on written constitutions.  Unwritten constitutions pose additional questions 
and arguably blur into the third category—considerations about the nature of law.  Cf. Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, The Myth of the Common Law Constitution, in COMMON LAW THEORY 204, 235–36 
(Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007) (describing the legal nature of unwritten constitutions in terms of 
official consensus). 
126. Cf. Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (Austl.) (giving preference to 
interpretations that would “best achieve the purpose or object of the Act”); id. s 15AB (codifying 
permitted use and sources of legislative history). 
127. See generally Manning, Deriving Rules, supra note 104 (describing different aspects of the 
Constitution that might inform statutory construction). 
128. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 28–34 (pointing to the lack of voluminous legislative history 
materials and the presence of multiple plausible interpretations of statutes at the state level as 
evidence of the greater ability of state courts to use the common law process to make policy 
determinations); John Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory Interpretation Case in History, 94 NW. 
U. L. Rev. 1445, 1468 (2000) (“The received wisdom suggests that state court judges have been 
more likely to follow textualist approaches than federal judges, but Popkin offers an insightful 
reason for why the opposite should be the case.”). 
129. I appreciate the dangers of talking about state constitutions in gross. Nevertheless, state 
constitutions also share features, and scholars of state constitutionalism address state separation of 
powers questions in general, see, for example, Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the 
Separation of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1457–60 
(1998); Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of 
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1238–40 (1999); Robert A. Schapiro, 
Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 79, 107–08 (1998); G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 
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A good starting point is Professor Eskridge’s argument that the original 
understanding of the “judicial Power” in Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
includes the equitable power to apply statutory provisions in light of statutory 
purpose and reason, even when doing so departs from the text’s semantic 
meaning.130  This historical argument relies on the practices of English 
common law judges between the years 1500–1800, as well as state court 
common law judges in the Founding and post-Founding eras.131  Similar 
originalist arguments could apply to state courts with even greater force, at 
least for judiciary provisions framed around the time of the Founding.132  
Further, although Eskridge’s evidence of practice in English and state courts 
with common law powers may be irrelevant for arguments about federal 
courts of limited jurisdiction,133 this aspect of Eskridge’s originalist case may 
be a feature, not a bug, for arguments about state court interpretation. 
Differences in constitutional structure may also point away from state 
court textualism.  Consider the argument for federal textualism based on 
constitutional structure.  Manning argues that legislation is often a product of 
messy and possibly unknowable compromise; that legislative choices about 
textual means are significant, for they “reflect the price that the legislature 
was willing to pay” to achieve a given end; and that a legislative choice 
between rules and standards reflects that important decision about means.134  
Overriding clear text in the name of purpose risks upsetting these legislative 
compromises and the choices about means that instantiate them.  Indeed, 
regular repair to purpose could impede compromise, for negotiators would 
always face the risk of courts abstracting away particular bargains in light of 
 
59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 340 (2003).  But see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF 
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 238 (2009) (“State constitutional separation of powers questions 
also call for a state-specific form of analysis rather than one applying a more generalized, or 
universalist, American-constitutional separation of powers doctrine.”).  At this stage of the inquiry, 
I am content to follow suit of the majority. 
130. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1096–98 (2001) (arguing 
that interpretations of statutes necessarily encompass nontextual considerations). 
131. Id. at 998–1008, 1010–30. 
132. Perhaps it is no coincidence that some of the least originalist state courts, such as Kaye’s 
New York and Peters’s Connecticut, are charter members of the union. 
133. See Manning, Deriving Rules, supra note 104, at 1662–63 (arguing that state judiciaries’ 
inheritance of general common law powers may have made it more natural for state courts to treat 
statutes merely as starting points for further common law reasoning); Manning, Equity of the 
Statute, supra note 69, at 30–36 (discussing the origins of the equity of statute doctrine in England 
and noting that the English judiciary always felt significant freedom to engage in atextual 
interpretation, perhaps because of its significant conflation of lawmaking and judging authority); 
see also Bellia, supra note 67, at 1548 (arguing that state courts did not use equitable doctrines in 
their interpretation of federal statutes). 
134. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1310–11; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, 
The Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63–65 
(1988) (emphasizing that the legislative process is essentially one of compromise; as such, any 
meaningful statutory interpretation must account for the means utilized by the legislature in getting 
a particular statute passed). 
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general purpose.135  Avoiding such risks, Manning argues, honors the 
Constitution’s structural norms.  The bicameralism and presentment 
requirements of Article I, Section Seven, the protection of small states in the 
Senate, and internal legislative procedures place compromise at the center of 
the federal lawmaking process and create a supermajority requirement for 
passing legislation, thus giving political minorities the power to block 
legislation or exact compromise.136  Article I’s explicit and exclusive vesting 
of the legislative power in Congress also weighs against judicial revision of 
clear language emerging from such bargains.137 
As Part III will discuss, many state constitutional structures also 
encourage compromise and separate the legislative and judicial power.  
Distinguishing features of state constitutional structure complicate this 
picture, however.  First, the fact remains that state courts still have inherent 
lawmaking power that extends beyond filling gaps and resolving ambiguities 
in statutes—they can fashion common law in the absence of statutes.138  The 
common law is a central point of contention in disputes between federal 
textualists and their critics.  Proponents of dynamic statutory interpretation in 
federal courts emphasize the persistence of common lawmaking in substance, 
if not in name, in ordinary statutory interpretation.139  Similarly, many 
scholars who criticize the Supreme Court’s restrictive approach to federal 
common law also reject textualism and its formalist approach to separation of 
powers.140  The limited, uncertain character of federal common law141 
 
135. See Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1314 (describing, in particular, how 
judicial resort to purpose can run the risk of bypassing the compromise-forcing structures that are an 
important part of the legislative bargaining process). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1305–06. 
138. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 5–6 (“The common law is, of course, lawmaking and 
policymaking by judges.  It is law derived not from authoritative texts such as constitutions and 
statutes, but from human wisdom collected case by case . . . .  That state courts—not federal 
courts—are the keepers of the common law has long been American orthodoxy.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  Many state courts also have legislative power to regulate court procedure and discipline 
the bar; moreover, some trial-level courts act like executive agencies in administering social 
services in family and drug courts.  Cf. Peters, supra note 52, at 1554–55, 1561–62 (noting first that, 
in Connecticut and Minnesota, the legislature and judiciary occasionally clash over control of court 
procedure, and second that, in Connecticut, judicial officers often serve in a social-service capacity 
in family and drug courts). 
139. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 383 (1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation is 
“fundamentally similar to judicial lawmaking in the areas of constitutional law and common law”); 
Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 225–26 (1999) (arguing 
that a fundamental commitment to a system of precedent is incompatible with the view that courts’ 
only legitimate role in statutory interpretation is to seek textual meaning, because the reality of any 
common law system means that any judicial determination regarding a statute will affect that 
statute’s subsequent interpretation). 
140. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. REV. 303, 
317 (1992) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s stance that federal common law violates the separation 
of powers, and instead embracing the view that federal common law operates to effect congressional 
intent); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 274–76 
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presents an obstacle to such arguments, however.  The leitmotif of Justice 
Scalia’s prominent defense of textualism is how federal courts are not 
common law courts—a tune Justice Young reprises in his defense of 
textualism in state courts.142  Such objections fall away for state courts, 
which are undisputedly common law courts.  The Supreme Court’s 
parsimonious understanding of federal common law may relieve federal 
textualists from considering the implications of general common law powers 
on statutory interpretation.  State court jurists have no such dispensation. 
In considering this point, it is also worth noting that most state judges 
are elected or face executive reappointment.143  This feature of state 
constitutional law originated in a wave of constitutional reform aimed at 
weakening powerful legislatures beholden to special interests.144  Along with 
this broader aim of shifting power from the legislature to “the people,” the 
embrace of judicial elections eliminated legislative appointment and 
reappointment in the hopes that the judiciary would check powerful, faction-
driven legislatures by “protect[ing] property and individual rights.”145  Of 
course, judicial independence often connotes separation from politics, but 
one might understand judicial elections today as creating a politically 
accountable, policy-making corrective to legislative dysfunction.146  If so, 
this could suggest a state law form of dynamic interpretation that links the 
 
(1992) (criticizing the view that the text of the Constitution can be read to establish a strict 
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches); Louise Weinberg, Federal 
Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 838–42 (1989) (arguing that a narrow view of federal 
common law—which purports to respect principles of separation of powers—instead reflects an 
unrealistic assessment of the nature of the judicial process, legal realism, and the character of 
American federalism).  But cf. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–12 (1988) 
(Scalia, J.) (authoring an opinion creating a federal common tort law defense). 
141. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (disavowing federal 
common law rule-making authority). 
142. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Young, supra note 56, at 281 
(advancing the argument for textualism on the grounds that courts have no responsibility, absent 
constitutional violations, to remake poor legislative policy choices). 
143. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1217 n.1, 1253 n.149. 
144. WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 285.  This reform movement also strengthened and gave 
independence to executive offices, citizen ballot initiatives and referenda, and procedural rules 
limiting legislative discretion.  See James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State 
Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 820 (1991) (discussing the introduction of new 
institutional devices, including the secret ballot, the initiative, and the referendum). 
145. WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 285; cf. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 69, at 
67–70 (discounting evidence of equitable interpretation in earlier periods because relevant courts 
were subject to legislative control). 
146. Originalists might suspect this inference to be anachronistic.  Advocates for judicial 
elections argued that the process would be best suited to select competent and impartial judges.  
Early advocates and opponents of judicial elections often shared a pre-legal realist understanding of 
the judge as an apolitical oracle or technician.  Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly 
Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
190, 210–13 (1993). 
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common law tradition with political accountability to weave “common and 
statutory law . . . together in a complex fabric.”147 
In short, prerogative common law powers blur the separation of the 
legislative and judicial branches in state government as compared to in the 
federal Constitution.  In general, this is an important datum for one seeking 
to derive interpretive principles from the Constitution.  In particular, if 
equitable interpretation comes part and parcel with common law powers, 
many state courts undisputedly can claim these—and a measure of political 
legitimacy—in ways that federal courts might not. 
C. Statutory Interpretation and Institutional Competence 
A second, more empirical perspective on interpretive choice calibrates 
interpretive method with the practical competences of the interpreter.  An 
adherent of the “institutional turn”148 in interpretation first identifies or 
assumes a value or set of values, identifies the relevant interpreter, and then 
asks what interpretive methods are most likely to promote the desired values, 
given the interpreter’s competences.  Pure arguments from institutional 
competence assume that the Constitution does not mandate any particular 
approach to statutes, or at least permits interpretive choice along these 
lines.149 
1. Institutional Arguments in Federal Scholarship.—Scholars have used 
institutional approaches to underwrite an array of interpretive methods.  
Professor Caleb Nelson grounds textualism in the belief that a rule-like 
approach to finding legislative intent will lead to fewer errors than reliance 
on legislative history or imaginative reconstruction.150  Professor Adrian 
Vermeule is perhaps the most thoroughgoing institutional advocate of 
textualism.  He argues that the federal judiciary’s institutional limits recom-
mend “wooden” interpretation that hews closely to the surface meaning of 
 
147. Kaye, supra note 43, at 20 (quoting David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory 
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 937 (1992)); see also Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1258–
59  (claiming that state judicial elections may legitimize updating statutory interpretation); Mashaw, 
supra note 124, at 1690; Popkin, supra note 63, at 194–97 (describing the republican statutory 
interpretation movement).  But see Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in 
Governance: Vive La Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2005) (“I reject the 
thoughtless notion that a judge on an elective court should approach a legal issue differently from an 
appointed colleague in a neighboring state.”). 
148. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
885, 886 (2003). 
149. See VERMEULE, supra note 112, at 33 (noting that decisions pertaining to interpretive 
methodology must necessarily be institutional because the Constitution cannot be read as suggesting 
one interpretive method over another). 
150. Nelson, supra note 23, at 377, 403–16; see Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and 
the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 254–56 (supporting textual 
statutory interpretation methods on the basis that the plain meaning of the text provides some 
common ground upon which individuals with divergent interests and abilities can approach a 
problem). 
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the particular clause in question.151  Because judges cannot know whether 
rules or standards generally lead to better empirical results, courts should 
always choose rules in particular cases to minimize decision costs without 
losing expected accuracy.152  For this reason, he concludes that a minimalist 
rule of plain meaning should trump background purpose or inferences from 
statutory structure and related statutes.153 
Not all institutional arguments conclude in textualism.  The regime 
textualism sought to displace—the purposivism of the Legal Process 
School—anchored its approach in the competences of various legal 
institutions.154  In fact, the current institutionalism in interpretive theory 
seems a direct descendent of the Legal Process.155  If so, institutional 
textualism does not oppose Hart and Sacks in principle, but rather disagrees 
with the purposive conclusions the Legal Process thinkers drew from their 
institutional assessment.  Similarly, Judge Posner’s defense of purposive 
interpretation points to the advantage courts have in smoothing the rough 
edges of blunt statutory rules.156  In theory, legislative amendment exists to 
cure absurd or over- and under-inclusive mischief in statutory language, but 
given the familiar costs and hurdles of legislative action, judicial reliance on 
legislative amendment is either foolish or mulish.  Imaginative reconstruction 
of congressional intent in particular situations, the argument goes, is far more 
likely to promote legislative intent than waiting for legislative intervention.157 
2. Institutional Competence and Common Law Powers.—The analysis 
below considers plausible goals an interpreter would seek to achieve through 
interpretation and then asks, in light of those goals, how the addition of 
general common law powers should change what courts do with statutes. 
 
151. VERMEULE, supra note 112, at 4. 
152. See, e.g., id. at 192–93 (discussing the high costs of using legislative history relative to the 
indeterminate benefits it provides). 
153. See, e.g., id. at 202–05 (concluding that enquiry beyond plain meaning provides little 
value and advocating for agency deference, as agencies are better suited than courts to delve into 
sources of collateral evidence regarding specific statutes).  Such a “satisficing” approach “searches 
among options or choices until, but only until, one is found that meets preset aspiration level—until, 
but only until, the choice is ‘good enough,’” as opposed to best or optimal.  Id. at 176–77. 
154. See Jeff A. King, Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 409, 422–23 (2008) (describing the theories of the members of the Legal Process School that 
involved institutional competences). 
155. See id. (linking the work of Vermeule and Sunstein with the Legal Process scholarship of 
Hart, Sacks, and Fuller). 
156. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes 
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189–90 (1986). 
157. See Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 608 
(1996) (arguing that judges should imaginatively reconstruct legislative intent when the statute must 
be applied to situations the legislators did not foresee); Posner, supra note 40, at 817–18 (arguing 
that the judge should try to “imagine how [the enacting legislators] would have wanted the statute 
applied to the case at bar”). 
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a. Historical Legislative Intent.—A common aim of statutory 
interpretation is giving effect to what the legislature intended at the time of 
enactment.158  Here, general common law powers seem to offer only modest 
improvements in competence.  If, as a matter of fact, common law concepts 
suffuse state statutes more than in federal legislation, a common law court 
may be more adept at inferring what the legislature meant in those instances.  
Accordingly, state judges may be more accurate in identifying an intended 
meaning that departs from a reasonably clear semantic meaning.  But this 
also seems to say more about the mix of concepts in statutes than interpretive 
method itself. 
This is not to deny other institutional differences between state and 
federal courts along this axis.  Compared to federal judges, state court judges 
are more likely to consult legislative drafting, to have held political office 
themselves (perhaps at the time of passage), or to have greater familiarity 
with the workings of the state legislature.159  These facts may increase a state 
judge’s accuracy in assessing a majority of the legislature’s actual or 
counterfactual intent.  Nevertheless, while intent skepticism could be less 
justified in state courts, those institutional differences have little to do with 
being a keeper of the common law tradition. 
b. Present Legislative Intent or Political Preferences.—Others 
argue that statutes should be interpreted to respect existing political 
preferences, whether they are reflected in the existing makeup of the 
legislature or the population more generally.160  Here, the traditional idea of 
the common law reflecting social custom or shared communal 
understandings may support the notion that state courts better feel the pulse 
of the polity.  Professor Eisenberg’s claim that all common law doctrine turns 
 
158. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 
1479–80 (1987). 
159. See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN 
STATE AND NATION 55 (1988) (“[O]ver 70 percent [of state judges] have held at least one 
nonjudicial political office prior to selection [as a judge], and most ha[ve] held two or more such 
offices.”); Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 55, at 1081–82, 1085 (noting that “[j]udges . . . 
participate in the formulation of proposed legislative policy through [formal] mechanisms” and 
informal mechanisms); Linde, supra note 147, at 1286 (explaining that elective state court members 
are more likely to have had legislative experience than the Supreme Court members and that judges 
in smaller states often consult with state legislators); Peters, supra note 52, at 1561 (observing that 
“[f]ederal courts . . . have much more limited opportunities to participate in institutional 
interventions” than state courts). 
160. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 54–56 (1982) 
(insisting that “inconsistent, unprincipled, or preferential treatment” in lawmaking should be 
respected so long as it represents the wishes of the current majorities or coalitions of minorities and 
is constitutional); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 
61 (1988) (proposing a “nautical theory” that would “treat statutes as if they were enacted 
yesterday”); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
2027, 2034 (2002) (supporting the proposition that judges should be constrained to maximize the 
extent to which statutory results accurately reflect the political preferences accepted in society). 
2013] Statutes in Common Law Courts 505 
 
 
on congruence with “social propositions”161 suggests that sensitivity to 
popular norms is part of the daily work of a common law jurist in the way 
that it may not be for a federal judge.  If common law practice offers a state 
court judge a more accurate gauge of societal norms than a federal judge can 
access, arguments over whether statutory “updating” is undemocratic or 
undermines legislative supremacy may be different in the state context. 
Again, we find that different institutional considerations may bolster the 
claim of state court divergence.  As Bruhl and Leib argue, the fact that many 
state judges face elections might—at least in some kinds of cases—give state 
judges an advantage over federal courts in identifying when contemporary 
popular preferences have outgrown text or historical intent.162  One could 
make similar points about the fact that many judges face reappointment or 
are otherwise plugged in to state politics in ways that many federal judges are 
not.163 
c. Good Policy.—A person assessing an interpretive methodology 
may consider not just faithful agency to statutory drafters or to contemporary 
opinion, but also desirable substantive results.  We can ask which interpretive 
method is likely to produce the most good, however defined.  If we think of 
the common law courts simply as bodies with general powers to make law 
through adjudication, state courts may have competence advantages over 
their federal court counterparts—advantages that may justify a more 
purposive or dynamic role in shaping policy via statutory interpretation. 
In making the normative judgments that accompany shaping doctrine in 
fields like tort, contract, and property law, state court judges have more 
opportunities than their federal counterparts to develop skills useful for 
crafting “good” law.  Common law courts also have greater opportunities to 
witness the consequences of their previous lawmaking actions, thus gaining 
the iterative experience of policy making over time and practice developing 
policy through adjudication.164  Here we have a modern take on the classical 
common lawyer’s claim that the discipline requires and produces judges 
“intimately familiar with the complex ‘texture [of] human affairs,’” thus 
making its practitioners more apt in practical reasoning than the average 
 
161. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 2–3 (1988). 
162. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1250–53. 
163. For a discussion of reappointment as opposed to re-election in state courts, see Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of 
State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 860–61 (2012) (discussing how, even in 
states where judges serve by appointment, “the vast majority [of high court judges] must also run in 
either a contested election or, more often, an uncontested public referendum in order to keep their 
jobs”). 
164. Cf. Stephen M. Johnson, Competition: The Next Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 18 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1, 36 (2009) (considering, in the context of 
administrative law, that it is better to rely on “case-by-case adjudications to develop . . . general 
agency rules” than through rule making). 
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person or, presumably, the mere follower of legislative fiat.165  Such 
experience would be useful in making ex post adjustments to legislation that, 
due to the limits of foreknowledge and human language, is necessarily 
imprecise when drafted ex ante.166 
To be sure, federal courts may have similar opportunities in 
constitutional law and in interpreting ambiguous or open-ended statutes, but 
state courts combine that experience with freestanding policy duties.167  This 
argument presumes, controversially, that common lawmaking is a discipline 
indistinct from practical policy making.  But in a private law tradition that 
includes Holmes and Posner, an assumption that merges common law with 
legislative judgment is not beyond the pale.168  Just as one might respect the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s wisdom in matters of corporate governance or 
defer to the Second Circuit’s in securities law, we might also find that 
common law judges are pragmatically wiser than their more constrained 
federal counterparts.  For judges like Roger Traynor, such faith in their 
ability to make reasoned and reasonable policy from the adjudicative perch 
underwrites not only their approach to the common law but their aggressive 
approach to statutory interpretation as well.169 
We can bolster this argument by pointing to other institutional 
advantages that state judges may have over their federal counterparts.  Some 
state judges may have further experience in the policy-making trenches due 
to de novo review of administrative agencies, as well as loosened 
justiciability doctrines that allow courts to resolve generalized grievances, 
issue advisory opinions in some states, and adjudicate disputes that federal 
courts would classify as political questions.170  Similar advantages may flow 
 
165. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. 
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 3 (2003).  The classical common lawyer would not agree that his 
discipline is a mere branch of legislation or applied philosophy.  See id. at 3–11 (describing the 
common lawyer’s conception of “artificial reason[ing]”). 
166. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128–36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the necessarily 
“open texture” of legislation). 
167. Federal courts, in principle, are also supposed to defer to administrative agencies on many 
questions of statutory policy.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844–85 (1984).  Only sixteen states give Chevron-strength deference to agency interpretations, 
while fourteen states use de novo review.  D. Zachary Hudson, Comment, A Case for Varying 
Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119 YALE L.J. 373, 374 (2009). 
168. But see ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 204, 206–08 (1995) (defending 
the autonomy of private law from public law); John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and 
Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1661–62 (2012) (same). 
169. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 411 (explaining that American judges 
played a far more active—and creative—role than their English counterparts in developing a 
uniquely American common law).  On Traynor’s belief in his ability as a policymaker, see 
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN 
JUDGES 243–66 (3d ed. 2007). 
170. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 129, 296–300 (pointing out significant state–federal 
distinctions such as “broad common-law powers of lawmaking,” the ability to “render advisory 
opinions,” and facility to litigate “issues that cannot be heard in federal courts because of the 
political question doctrine”); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking 
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from implementing many state constitutions’ more robust guarantees of 
positive political and economic rights.171  Finally, it is plausible that state 
judges’ political accountability may lead to better policy making. 
The argument so framed begins to resemble a familiar justification in 
the federal context for Chevron deference to administrative agencies’ 
interpretations of statutes.  One justification of Chevron points to administra-
tive agencies’ political accountability—a point Bruhl and Leib explore in 
their work on judicial elections.172  A second justification, and the one most 
relevant here, is the agency’s policy-making expertise compared to that of 
Article III judges.173  Professor Cass Sunstein has tellingly argued that 
federal agencies are the contemporary equivalents of the common law courts 
that previously forged the path of American law.174  Sunstein and Vermeule 
further argue that even if federal judges should be textualists, there is good 
reason for them to defer to purposive interpretations by agencies.175  
Agencies’ institutional advantages help them know when “departures from 
the text actually make sense” and whether such departures will destabilize 
the statutory scheme.176  If, like federal agencies, state courts’ policy 
competence is superior to that of the federal courts, the argument for state 
court textualism is weaker than in federal jurisprudence. 
III. The Potential Irrelevance of Common Law Powers 
The previous Part identified how general common law powers can 
strengthen the constitutional and institutional arguments for more purposive 
or dynamic approaches to statutes by state courts.  This Part will challenge 
those constitution- and competence-based arguments and introduce more 
 
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844–75 (2001) (explaining that, unlike federal 
courts, state courts can issue advisory opinions, adjudicate “political questions,” and review 
administrative agency decisions); Linde, supra note 147, at 1274–75 (giving examples of state court 
decisions that would violate justiciability if ordered in federal courts). 
171. See, e.g., TARR & PORTER, supra note 159, at 51 (observing that some state constitutions 
offer “more detailed and extensive protections” than those contained in the federal Constitution); 
G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1176–78 (1992) 
(identifying examples of substantive constitutional rights that implement specific policies). 
172. Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1248–49; cf. Hudson, supra note 167, at 375–77 
(explaining that state agency officials and federal judges are not as politically accountable as state 
judges). 
173. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program 
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly, 
or explicitly, by Congress.” (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))); Sunstein & 
Vermeule, supra note 148, at 904 (“[I]f a high degree of technical expertise is required, judicial 
judgments might well be unreliable.” (footnote omitted)). 
174. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 
47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998); see also Hudson, supra note 167, at 377–78 (explaining that state 
courts, due to their common law origins, are capable of filling in the legal and practical gaps 
resulting from legislative processes). 
175. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 148, at 928. 
176. Id. 
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basic philosophical reasons to question the difference that the common law 
prerogative makes in the statutory context. 
A. Common Law and the Constitution 
Not all inferences from state constitutional rules and structure suggest 
that general common law powers allow greater judicial flexibility with 
enacted legislation.  If common law powers are grants of authority for courts 
to make law through adjudication, a skeptic could object that it is simply a 
non sequitur to infer that lawmaking in one domain—adjudication where the 
legislature is silent—translates into lawmaking authority in another—
applying statutes a legislature has enacted.177  As Professor Monaghan has 
argued in a related context, “the fact that the courts can make law when the 
political organs are silent . . . does not legitimate a similar authority when the 
political organs have spoken.”178  Without some understanding about the 
division of authority and the hierarchical relationship between the legislature 
and the courts, we can say little about how courts should fill gaps in statutes, 
extend or restrict statutes, correct absurd statutes and scrivener’s errors, or 
even update or override outdated statutes. 
As noted above, the constitutional case for common law differentiation 
may depend on an originalist argument linking the judicial power with 
equitable interpretation that can expand or restrict the scope of statutes in 
light of common law reason.  One problem with this argument is that even 
state champions of common law differentiation concede that legislation can 
override judge-made rules.179  State law may be a dialogue between courts 
 
177. Like the affirmative case, the skeptical case in this subpart assumes that common law 
adjudication is a form of positive lawmaking—a position that finds support on both sides of the 
purposivist–textualist divide.  See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural 
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1247–49 (1996) (noting that federal courts engage in 
“interstitial ‘lawmaking’” as part of the process of interpreting statutes and make positive law when 
they create federal common law rules); Kaye, supra note 43, at 11 (“[S]tate courts effectively ‘make 
law,’ and do so by reference to social policy, not only when deciding traditionally common-law 
cases but also when faced with cases that involve difficult questions of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation.”); Kramer, supra note 140, at 267 (stating that courts make law when they articulate 
any rule “that is not easily found on the face of an applicable statute”).  This last assumption is 
controversial and may not accord with how some state courts understand their common law 
jurisprudence.  See also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common 
Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 898–901 (2005) (surveying state court decisions applying federal 
common law wherein the state courts, in creating new rules in federal common law cases, did not 
understand themselves to be making new law but rather were applying existing principles and 
precedent); Green, supra note 98, at 1126 (observing that some state courts understand common law 
in nonpositivist terms).  Nevertheless, I hope to bracket jurisprudential questions about the nature of 
the common law until later. 
178. Monaghan, supra note 123, at 370.  For the record, Professor Monaghan voiced no 
objection to purposive interpretation.  See id. (“We expect courts to interpret statutes, at least in 
their marginal applications, on the premise that the legislature seeks to promote the public 
good . . . .”). 
179. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 21 (“[L]egislatures at times express their disagreement by 
‘repealing’ or ‘vetoing’ other common-law doctrines.”). 
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and legislatures, but advocates of common law purposivism in state courts do 
not claim, for example, that a court can override legislative corrections of its 
previous interpretations.180  If this is so, it is fair to ask why courts should 
have similar freedom with reasonably clear statutes when a legislature has 
not yet rebuked a court.181 
Another problem with applying the originalist argument for equitable 
interpretation in the state context is the varying vintage of state compacts.  It 
may be plausible to attribute a quasi-natural law, nonpositivistic 
understanding of judging as included in the “Judiciary Power” to a document 
like the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution.182  Such an inference may be 
shakier for constitutions whose judiciary provisions were adopted or 
amended in a twentieth century where norms of legislative supremacy are 
comparatively stronger.183  Accordingly, originalist arguments for equitable 
interpretation in many state courts could be vulnerable to a similar objection 
of anachronism raised by textualists in the federal context.184 
Even setting these objections aside, other structural features of state 
constitutionalism suggest that common law powers should not play a strong 
role in the interpretation of statutes.  As noted, constitutional arguments for 
federal textualism rely on text-based inferences in support of separation of 
powers formalism.185  Many of the features textualists identify as separating 
the federal judiciary from Congress also exist in state regimes: bicameralism 
and presentment,186 salary protection,187 and the prohibition on bills of 
 
180. See id. at 23 (“No one can question the legislature’s authority to correct or redirect a state 
court’s interpretation of a statute.”).  But see Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1755–56, 1785–
98 (describing state courts’ refusal to follow legislated rules of statutory interpretation). 
181. This objection also applies to theories that ascribe to federal courts similar common law 
powers.  See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 
939 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)) (“Nothing in 
Eskridge’s theory explains the disjunction between using purely positivistic approaches to 
interpretation in the easy cases—where a recently-enacted statute speaks plainly and no strong 
policy choices counsel another result—and nonpositivistic approaches in other situations.”); 
Monaghan, supra note 123, at 375 (highlighting tension in nonoriginalist theories of constitutional 
interpretation that adhere to the original meaning of “‘recent’ constitutional amendments”). 
182. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3. 
183. See Tarr, supra note 129, at 332 (“[T]oday’s state constitutions were established at various 
points in the nation’s history, reflecting the political ideas reigning at those particular points in time, 
. . . this in turn has affected the institutions that were created and the relationships established 
among them.”). 
184. See Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 69, at 8 (arguing that the English doctrine 
of equitable interpretation of statutes as an inherent judicial power was rendered obsolete and 
anachronistic by the ratification of the Constitution). 
185. See generally Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1290, 1304–06 (justifying 
textualism by reference to principles of separation of powers and the structure and function of 
Congress as conceived of by the Constitution); Manning, Deriving Rules, supra note 104, at 1649–
50 (contending that the structure of the Constitution and specific separation of powers provisions 
agitate against equitable interpretation of federal statutes by federal courts). 
186. All states except Nebraska have a two-chambered legislature and all states have an 
executive veto. 
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attainder and ex post facto legislation.188  Scholarship in state constitutional 
law also notes—if only to decry—that state courts often follow formalist 
federal jurisprudence on separation of powers.189 
If anything, the separation norms in many state constitutional regimes 
are stronger than in the federal context.  One specific indicator of judicial 
caution is the “antifederalist” approach to separation of powers that a leading 
scholar of state constitutional law has identified in state jurisprudence.190  
That line of thought adopts the Whig tradition of strict separation of powers 
and legislative omnipotence, a combination hostile to a vigorous judicial role 
in statutory interpretation.  Unlike the federal Constitution, many state 
compacts also have explicit and strict separation of powers provisions.191  
Some question the effect of these textual commitments in state 
jurisprudence,192 but such provisions bridge a potential pitfall for federal 
separation of powers formalists.193  This feature of state constitutional theory 
has been prominent in the administrative law context, where state courts are 
more willing than their federal counterparts to enforce a nondelegation 
doctrine.194  Similarly, a notable departure in state courts from strict 
 
187. See Amended State Constitutional Provisions Regarding Reductions to Judicial Salaries 
(January 2009), NCSC, http://www.ncsconline.org/d_kis/salary_survey/provisions.asp (reporting 
that twenty-nine states clearly prohibit reductions in judicial salaries and that another five states 
permit reductions only if applicable to all public officers). 
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
189. See Schapiro, supra note 129, at 88–92 (surveying and criticizing state supreme court 
decisions relying on federal separation of powers doctrine in interpreting state constitutions). 
190. See Rossi, supra note 129, at 1172 (“Like Antifederalist political science, many states, 
more than federal courts, view separation of powers as requiring complete separation of functions 
and most states see the legislature as the supreme lawmaker.”). 
191. WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 236–37; Tarr, supra note 129, at 337–38.  Compare THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“[P]owers properly 
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either 
of the other departments.” (emphasis added)), with IND. CONST. art. 3, §  1 (“The powers of the 
Government are divided into three separate departments; the Legislative, the Executive including 
the Administrative, and the Judicial: and no person, charged with official duties under one of these 
departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly 
provided.” (emphasis added)). 
192. Rossi, supra note 129, at 1220 (questioning the explanatory power of textual 
interpretations of state separation of powers provisions in light of the wide divergence in separation 
of powers approaches amongst states with similar separation of powers clauses).  But see Askew v. 
Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978) (deriving a strong nondelegation doctrine 
from the Florida Constitution’s Separation of Powers Clause); Tarr, supra note 129, at 338 (“[Such 
text] encourages an interpreter to employ . . . the formalist approach to the separation of 
powers . . . .”). 
193. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 1944 (2011) (“The Constitution contains no Separation of Powers Clause.”). 
194. See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and 
State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1343, 1359 (2005) (arguing that state nondelegation doctrine is “much more rigid” than in 
the federal context). 
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separation—tolerance of a legislative veto—is consistent with a 
constitutional commitment to legislative branch policy making.195 
Many state constitutions also contain more compromise-forcing 
“vetogates” than the U.S. Constitution.  Beyond preexisting bicameralism 
and presentment requirements,196 many state constitutions have line item 
vetoes, detailed rules governing legislative procedure, single-subject and 
balanced-budget requirements, and shortened legislative sessions.197  To be 
sure, many of these requirements arose out of a second wave of amendments 
in response to the excesses of legislatures, which were awarded 
disproportionate power under original constitutional arrangements.198  While 
these amendments may mute the parliamentary character of state 
constitutions, they do not encourage functionalist blending of legislative 
functions across branches.  If, as federal textualists claim, constitutional 
vetogates are compromise-forcing mechanisms that judges should respect 
while interpreting statutes,199 the more finely calibrated procedures and limits 
in state constitutions further militate against judicial smoothing of sharp 
statutory corners. 
B. Common Law and Institutional Competence 
The institutionalist arguments against common law differentiation 
minimize the potential benefits that the practice of such powers brings to 
courts, while emphasizing the limits to judicial competence—limits that 
general common law powers do not diminish and might even exacerbate. 
If the aim of statutory interpretation is discerning historical legislative 
intent, a court’s common law powers are of modest import.200  As noted 
above, if common law concepts are more common in state statutes, a state 
court may be marginally better at identifying background norms at odds with 
semantic textual meaning.  On the other hand, a common law court may 
overestimate the extent to which common law concepts pervade statutes, 
given the salience that those concepts have for a court steeped in that 
tradition.  Accordingly, state courts could be more likely to erroneously 
impute common law meaning.  In any event, intent in statutes that abrogate 
 
195. See Rossi, supra note 129, at 1217 (identifying “underenforcement of . . . restrictions on 
the legislative veto” in state constitutional law). 
196. All states have a gubernatorial veto of some kind, and every state except Nebraska has two 
legislative chambers that must approve legislation. 
197. See WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 257–67 (exploring procedural restrictions state 
constitutions impose on the legislative process); Tarr, supra note 129, at 335 (surveying state 
constitutional restrictions on process and substance designed to check legislative abuses). 
198. Id. at 334–35. 
199. See Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1314–15 (arguing that because of 
procedural mechanisms that promote compromise in the legislative process, courts should prefer 
clear text over legislative history in interpreting a statute in order to remain true to the political 
compromises presumably underlying the final text of the legislation). 
200. See supra subsection II(C)(2)(a) (describing the limited improvements to competence in 
statutory interpretation provided by common law powers). 
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the common law or legislate in the absence of common law would not be 
intrinsically clearer to a common law court. 
As with historical intent, one can argue that common law powers have 
little to do with gauging present legislative intent or more general political 
preferences.  Even if one were to concede the (controversial) premise that 
common law courts more frequently must gauge social norms in 
adjudication,201 it is fair to wonder whether practice makes more perfect in 
this context.  Given that state judges, like their federal counterparts, are often 
part of the political and legal elite,202 there are grounds for skepticism here, 
or at least there is reason to be more confident about judges’ ability to 
estimate the current legislature’s preferences, rather than those of the 
populace.  Nor is it clear that any marginal advantage in gauging historical or 
present legislative intent or political preferences would justify a wholesale 
change in interpretive method.  If the institutional textualist is convinced that 
a rule-like, plain meaning approach to interpretation will lead to significantly 
fewer errors over the long run in gauging intent,203 she might ask for more 
than the concededly indirect gains that the advocate of common law 
difference offers her. 
Finally, there are serious objections to the Chevron-inspired argument 
that, even if federal courts should be textualist, common law courts’ superior 
policy-making expertise justifies their use of purposive or dynamic 
approaches.204  State courts share many of the institutional infirmities that 
lead textualists to disfavor courts’ interpretive policy making.  Like federal 
courts, state courts lack expert staff and fact-finding abilities.205  State courts 
must also take concrete cases as they come, rather than investigating and 
initiating general proceedings.206  This case-based nature of adjudicative 
lawmaking limits a court’s ability to control a policy agenda and to see the 
effects of policy over time.  Adjudication’s intense focus on the particular 
facts at hand rather than the broader picture may also lead to blinkered policy 
 
201. See supra subsection II(C)(2)(b) (discussing the contention that state court judges must 
weigh social custom and communal understanding in exercising their traditional common law 
powers). 
202. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 159, at 55 (noting that “often . . . [state] justices are the 
products of politically active families,” “20 percent have served in the state legislature,” “almost 
20 percent have served in the state attorney general’s office,” and “over 70 percent have held at 
least one nonjudicial political office prior to selection”). 
203. See supra section II(C)(1). 
204. See supra subsection II(C)(2)(c). 
205. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 
104 NW. U. L. REV. 799, 836–37 (2010) (discussing agencies’ comparative competence in fact 
gathering and policy making). 
206. See WALTER F. MURPHY & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW 65–66 
(1972) (stating that courts are “usually passive instruments of government” lacking a “self-starter” 
and that “[n]ormally, someone outside of the judicial system has to bring a suit or invoke a set of 
special circumstances to transform judicial power from a potential to a kinetic state”). 
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making.207  As Lon Fuller also long ago noted, multidimensional policy 
problems—ones that are most likely to stretch courts beyond their familiar 
common law competence—may not be amenable to resolution through 
adjudication, including through the common law method.208 
If we are looking to federal administrative law for guidance on this 
question, it pays to also consider how that body of learning is suspicious of 
adjudicative policy making by agencies—bodies with policy-making 
competences exceeding those of common law courts.  There is doubt about 
whether Chevron deference applies to agencies that, like courts, have power 
to adjudicate but not promulgate legislative rules.209  The deference that 
agency adjudications receive does not displace the longstanding criticism that 
scholars levy at agencies that eschew rule making in favor of adjudicative 
policy making.210  Those concerns, if true and if extended by analogy to state 
courts, militate against purposivist or dynamic interpretation.  A state legal 
system, just like a federal agency, has rule making and adjudicative outlets 
for policy making—the legislature and the courts, respectively.  Purposive or 
dynamic interpretation by courts would be analogous to administrative policy 
making by adjudication: the adjudicative body—the courts—would develop 
and change general rules on a case-by-case basis, thus shifting the center of 
policy making gravity from legislation to adjudication.  Textualism, by 
comparison, seeks to give primacy to a centralized lawmaker with broader 
perspective and fact-finding abilities.211  If, as some have argued, a 
requirement that agencies use rule making in some instances is not judicially 
manageable,212 it may also be challenging for a state court to decide whether 
de facto rule making (textualist) or adjudication (purposivist) is proper. 
 
207. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006) 
(arguing that, if he or she only focuses on the facts of the case at hand, a judge may produce a 
suboptimal rule for later cases if the case at hand is not representative “of the full array of events 
that the ensuing rule or principle will encompass”). 
208. See LON L. FULLER, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL 
ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 86, 111–21 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981) 
(explaining why “polycentric” problems are frequently unsuited to solution by adjudication). 
209. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 890 
(2001) (noting the circuit split on the issue and arguing that the power to issue binding, self-
executing adjudications is sufficient).  Compare Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 
(2002) (reserving judgment on question), with id. at 122 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“We have, of 
course, previously held that because the EEOC was not given rulemaking authority to interpret the 
substantive provisions of Title VII, its substantive regulations do not receive Chevron 
deference . . . .”). 
210. For an encomium to the superiority of rule making, see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8 (5th ed. 2010). 
211. From this perspective, barriers to action facing state legislatures may still leave state court 
updating a second-best option.  Cf. Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification—A Modest Proposal, 
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453, 453 (1995) (bemoaning procedural obstacles to administrative rule 
making). 
212. John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 894–95 (2004). 
514 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:479 
 
 
C. The Common Law and Concepts of Legal Interpretation 
A philosophically inclined person might object that talking straight 
away about constitutional authority and competence skips a critical first step, 
namely having a theory about what it means to “interpret” a legal text at all.  
If, for example, the textualist separation of semantic meaning from purpose is 
conceptually impossible or if equitable correction of texts is not 
“interpretation,” the constitution- and competence-based arguments above 
may confuse more basic issues about law and interpretation.  A critic with 
such concerns would instead put two theoretical horses before the 
constitutional or competence cart.  First, we need a theory about reading and 
understanding legal texts.  Let’s call these commitments the interpreter’s 
hermeneutical framework.  Second, because we are interpreting legal texts, 
beliefs about the nature of law in general—or statutes and common law in 
particular—may be similarly basic.  Let’s call these beliefs the interpreter’s 
jurisprudential framework.  In recent years, legal philosophers have 
increasingly explored links between hermeneutical and jurisprudential 
understandings, an inquiry that may raise corresponding inferences about 
how an interpreter handles statutes.213 
Considering these foundational questions offers two very different but 
plausible arguments that common law powers are irrelevant to interpretive 
choice.  Before presenting those arguments, however, it helps first to say 
more about these more basic frameworks. 
1. First Principles. 
a. Hermeneutical Framework.—This may all sound quite abstract, 
and the literature and arguments on this score are vast and complex.  But we 
can get the feel for this aspect of interpretive choice by going back to the 
classic debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller about an ordinance 
prohibiting “vehicles in the park.”214  An interpreter must decide whether the 
ordinance applies to things like roller skates, ambulances, or strollers.215  
Hart would approach this problem by distinguishing between the “core” and 
“penumbra” of a rule.216  There will be situations—think of a Hummer 
 
213. For a collection of works along these lines, see LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).  In his Preface, Marmor notes that in arguments 
about interpretation “a close but controversial link emerges . . . between the concept of 
interpretation and the concept of law.”  Id. at vii; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, 
Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 203. 
214. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958). 
215. Hart, supra note 214, at 607. 
216. Id. 
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zooming across the grass, blasting hair metal from tricked-out speakers217—
that are easy cases.  There, the law governs without much work for the judge 
besides recognizing the fit between the situation and the ordinance.  But there 
will also be peripheral cases—think of a tricycle—where it is unclear 
whether the rule prohibiting “vehicles” applies.  There, the judge must 
exercise discretion.  The judge makes new law, drawing sharp lines in a 
region that the legislature left fuzzy.  As we move from the core of a rule to 
the periphery, we move from the realm of legal interpretation to lawmaking 
discretion.218 
Lon Fuller challenged the core and penumbra dichotomy.219  In the 
apparently peripheral case of a tricycle, the argument goes, the interpreter 
does not exercise legislative discretion to include or exclude trikes within the 
category of “vehicles,” but rather seeks to identify, articulate, and apply the 
purpose of the statute, which either includes trikes or does not.220  Nor in the 
ostensibly “core” case of a jeep does an interpreter simply recognize and 
categorize a jeep as a qualifying “vehicle.”  A functioning yet immobile jeep 
placed in the park as a war memorial is as vehicular as it gets, but is not 
obviously classified as core or penumbral.221  Legal rules, Fuller argues, are 
only comprehensible in light of their background purposes, which thus 
collapses the distinction between linguistic rule following at the core and 
discretionary legislation at the periphery.222 
A version of this hoary squabble continues today.  Contemporary 
textualism depends on a similar distinction between the core and periphery.  
Manning’s central tenet of textualism—privileging semantic meaning over 
statutory policy in cases of conflict—presumes the Hartian claim that there 
are cases in which a core semantic meaning covers and thus decides a case.223  
 
217. See, e.g., MӦTLEY CRÜE, Kickstart My Heart, on DR. FEELGOOD (Elektra 1989) 
(exemplifying the genre). 
218. See HART, supra note 166, 128–32 (arguing that courts must exercise discretion akin to 
that of rule-making bodies in difficult cases where there is no “one uniquely correct answer to be 
found, as distinct from an answer which is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting 
interests”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 194–97 
(1979) (explaining that legislators often pass “deliberately underdetermined rules” because they 
prefer to let the courts exercise discretion in filling in the gaps within the limits of a core general 
framework and giving rules referring to reasonableness, fairness, and just cause as examples). 
219. See Fuller, supra note 214, at 661–69 (rejecting Hart’s assertion that the only way to 
effectuate “the ideal of fidelity to law” is to adopt his theory of interpretation, which Fuller 
criticizes for its focus on the meaning of individual words rather than statutory purpose and 
structure). 
220. See id. at 665–66 (stating that, in all situations, a judge should seek to decide whether a 
particular outcome is consistent with the purpose of the statute). 
221. Id. at 663. 
222. Id. 
223. The cognate form of originalist textualism in constitutional interpretation relies on a 
similar distinction.  See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010) (distinguishing “interpretation” of the original and public 
semantic meaning of constitutional text from “construction” of the text when its meaning is 
underdetermined). 
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By contrast, collapsing the meaning–purpose dichotomy will strengthen 
arguments that dynamic or strongly purposive approaches are compatible 
with legislative supremacy—an interpreter has a constructive role not merely 
at the putative periphery, but in all cases.  Related claims about the 
insufficiency of textual meaning or original intent also have more force if a 
sharp distinction between text and context is untenable.224  On that ground, 
textualism is impossible. 
b. Jurisprudential Framework.—Hermeneutic beliefs—commit-
ments about what it means to “interpret” a legal text—may also form 
“natural alliances” with understandings about the nature of law.225  For 
example, some intentionalists link their approach to statutory interpretation 
with forms of legal positivism.  Professor Alexander argues that because 
law’s task is to make moral decisions more determinate, law does not do its 
job when it points us to general moral standards.  To succeed, law must offer 
rules announced in texts that communicate the authority’s determinations and 
override the audience’s moral judgment.  The aim of legal interpretation, 
then, is to understand what the authority intended to communicate.  Anything 
more complex, Alexander argues, is an act of re-authorship or moral 
judgment, not legal interpretation.226  One could craft a similar positivist 
argument for textualism by shifting the locus of authority from the speaker’s 
meaning (intentionalism) to the reasonable reader’s meaning (textualism).  If 
the function and nature of law is to provide authoritative guidance, 
textualism’s adherence to a text’s objective, semantic meaning avoids both 
the uncertainty (or incoherence) of searching for subjective intent and the 
indeterminacy and discretion of seeking a coherent, overarching purpose.227 
 
224. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
609, 618 (1990) (“[I]nterpreter and text are indissolubly linked as a matter of being; the text is part 
of the context that has formed the interpreter, and the interpreter is the agent of the text’s continued 
viability.”); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 139, at 342–43 (noting the importance of both original 
and current context in textual interpretation). 
225. Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 213, at 405, 406.  Hurd’s use of “alliances” is apt.  The claim that a theory 
of law has necessary consequences for legal decision making is controversial.  See generally Brian 
Bix, Robert Alexy, Radbruch’s Formula and the Nature of Legal Theory, 37 RECHTSTHEORIE 139 
(2006). 
226. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority 
of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 213, at 
357, 359–63 (explaining that “texts mean what their authors intend them to mean” and, therefore, 
when interpreting a text, a judge changes a text when he diverts from the author’s intentions); see 
also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493, 518 (2005) (condemning natural law theories of judicial decision making 
on the basis that they lead to the usurpation of legislative supremacy). 
227. See Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 19, at 2457–58 (articulating a reasonable 
reader’s approach to meaning); cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175, 1185 (1989) (“But when [a court] does not have a solid textual anchor or an established 
social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like 
legislation.”). 
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Critics of original intent and textualist interpretation of statutes also 
point to links between these theories of meaning and legal positivism.228  
Connections between nonpositivist theories of law and theories of statutory 
interpretation are similarly evident.  Ronald Dworkin provides a classic 
example; the initial chapter of Law’s Empire is entitled “What is Law?” and 
probes that question through examples of statutory interpretation.229  His 
general jurisprudence understands “law” not as merely posited rules that 
apply or not, but as a practice of “interpretive judgments” in which we 
construct from legal materials and moral principles a theory of the law that 
makes it the “best it can be.”230 
From this general statement about the nature of law follows Dworkin’s 
claim “that statutes must be read in whatever way follows from the best 
interpretation of the legislative process as a whole.”231  Thus, he highlights 
the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Riggs v. Palmer232 to deny an 
inheritance to a testator’s murderer, even though murder fell into none of the 
exceptions to inheritance in New York’s statute governing wills.233  By 
contrast, he criticizes as formalistic the Supreme Court’s decision to halt the 
construction of a nearly completed, $100 million dam pursuant to a statutory 
prohibition on projects jeopardizing the “continued existence” of an 
endangered “three-inch fish of no particular beauty or biological interest or 
general ecological importance.”234  Against arguments that semantically clear 
text, when it exists, should trump background principles and policies, 
Dworkin rejects any sharp distinction between clear and unclear cases.235  
Echoing Fuller’s discussion of vehicles in the park, Dworkin argues that easy 
statutory cases only appear to be solved by text alone because the text and 
moral principles in those situations are harmonious.236  Dworkin’s theory 
 
228. See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 252–54 (2011) (describing critics of textualism’s 
linkage of the theory to legal positivism); Hurd, supra note 225, at 413–18 (arguing that the theory 
of intentionalist interpretation is compelling only when the citizenry believes that the legislature 
functions as a practical authority, i.e., that “laws function as commands rather than requests”).  As 
Shapiro and Hurd note, textualism or intentionalism may not inextricably flow from positivism. 
229. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15–23 (1986); see also Hurd, supra note 225, at 425 
(locating “the theoretical authority of law” primarily in legislative text, while judging all 
“interpretive techniques” by “their ability to conform our conduct to the demands of morality”); 
Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 286–88 (1985) 
(propounding a natural law theory of adjudication as opposed to one rooted in legal positivism); 
Goldsworthy, supra note 226, at 510–18 (exploring the links between these theorists’ jurisprudential 
and interpretive theories). 
230. DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 53, 225. 
231. Id. at 337. 
232. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
233. Id. at 190–91. 
234. DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 20–21 (discussing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 
(1978)). 
235. Id. at 350–54. 
236. See, e.g., id. at 351 (arguing that the will statute in Riggs is unclear only “because we 
ourselves have some reason to think that murderers should not inherit”). 
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about how to read legal texts and how to conceive of law are one and the 
same. 
With this rough-and-ready introduction to hermeneutical and 
jurisprudential approaches to statutory interpretation in hand, we can now 
turn to two plausible arguments that the presence or absence of general 
common law powers is irrelevant to a court’s approach to statutory 
interpretation. 
2. The Argument from Semantic Belief and Common Law Skepticism.—
This offered approach first assumes that an interpreter can disentangle the 
text’s semantic meaning from policy context or background moral principles.  
Like Hart, a person adopting this framework believes legal language can 
have a “core,” in which a statute obviously covers the facts at hand.  These 
semantically “easy” cases—the Hummer blasting music as a “vehicle in the 
park”—contrast with “hard” cases where application of the core meaning 
creates uncertain results—the tricycle in the park.  Like Manning and 
Alexander, such a theorist believes that it is possible for semantic meaning to 
be clear and knowable even if it runs at cross-purposes with the statute’s 
likely purpose.  Barring ice cream trucks or ambulances from a park might 
seem strange, but the “no vehicles” rule covers both. 
This framework would also assume that all law, including common law 
precedent, is modeled on posited, authoritative legislation.  I call this 
common law “skepticism” because it doubts the traditional common lawyer’s 
claim that the law is comprised of unfolding reason, preexisting custom, or 
principles immanent in the case law.  Instead, as Alexander argues, common 
law adjudication consists of creating, following, or amending rules that 
happen to be handed down by judges rather than legislators.237  This is so 
even if judges exercise restraint through stare decisis or decisional 
minimalism.238  This legislative understanding of common law features into 
discussions of federal common law by its champions and critics alike.239  
 
237. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 25–26 
(2008) (courts either “reason deductively from rules posited by others; or they posit law, relying on 
moral and empirical judgment, as any lawmaker must”); Pojanowski, supra note 205, at 814–20 
(describing legislative understanding of common law); see also A.W.B. Simpson, The Common 
Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: SECOND SERIES 77, 89 (1973) 
(describing and criticizing this as the “school-rules” model of common law). 
238. See RAZ, supra note 218, at 200–01 (noting that even the traditionally conservative 
lawmaking role of the courts involves partial reform measures that “introduce[] pragmatic conflict 
into the law”). 
239. See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 468 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(explaining that federal common law “to put it bluntly,” allows the Court to “make our own law 
from materials found in common-law sources”); Clark, supra note 177, at 1247–49 (raising 
concerns about federal judicial lawmaking intruding on the powers of the legislature and of the 
states); Kramer, supra note 140, at 267 (“[T]he common law includes any rule articulated by a court 
that is not easily found on the face of an applicable statute.”). 
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Many state court judges, including those who reject semantic limits in 
statutory interpretation, also speak of the common law in such a fashion.240 
An interpreter with these twin assumptions would not view many hard 
legal questions as concerning the “interpretation” of statutes or precedent at 
all.  The difference between a rule’s solid core of meaning and the open 
texture of its periphery renders the term law-“making” more apt than law-
“finding” in unclear precedential and statutory cases alike.  In cases of first 
impression or where a statute’s semantic meaning or authoritative intent run 
out, the law offers no single answer and the judge has authority to resolve the 
matter through discretion.241  Similarly, when a judge reverses a precedent or 
refuses to apply the no vehicles rule to the ambulance, these are exercises of 
legislative power, not interpretation.  In short, this arrangement collapses 
common law into the legislative idiom, with the difference between common 
and statute law turning on a rule’s mode of origin—judge versus 
legislature—not substance.242 
From this perspective, a state court’s possession of general common 
lawmaking powers does not alone entail divergence from federal court 
approaches to statutes.  Both state and federal courts can have delegated 
authority to “make law” within statutory gaps, while the state courts have the 
additional prerogative to “legislate” in the absence of statutory coverage.  
The delegated lawmaking powers that state and federal courts share with 
respect to statutes have little to do with actual “interpretation,” as both courts 
make law in the gaps rather than find legal meaning.243  So understood, a 
state court’s additional, general lawmaking powers lead to divergence from 
federal practice only if that power further authorizes state courts to override a 
statute’s clear semantic commands in a way that federal courts cannot.  A 
court’s exercise of this expanded prerogative involves a de facto amendment 
of the statute, not its interpretation.  Whether a court has that power is a 
question of constitutional rules regarding lawmaking hierarchy, not an 
entailment of a freestanding power to make law where the legislature has not.  
If state and federal courts both accept similar forms of legislative supremacy, 
 
240. See Kaye, supra note 43, at 10 (“In spite of the anxiety surrounding the legitimacy of 
judicial lawmaking, I believe that the inherent, yet principled flexibility of the common law remains 
the defining feature of the state court judicial process today.”); Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a 
Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 751 (1970) [hereinafter Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle] 
(characterizing judging as “the recurring choice of one policy over another” in the formulation of 
new rules). 
241. Cf. HART, supra note 166, at 131–32 (contending that precedent, despite its binding force, 
often leaves the law open for judicial legislation). 
242. See Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021489## (“Modern lawyers . . . . tend to assume that the unwritten law of 
each state is fundamentally like the written law of each state, except that it is made by a different 
branch of the state government . . . .”). 
243. See Alexander, supra note 226, at 359–63 (asserting that texts only carry the meaning that 
was intended by their authors and that therefore any changes to that meaning are not actually 
interpretations of the text at all). 
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however, it is not clear that a state court’s broader yet nevertheless defeasible 
lawmaking powers make any difference in the interpretation of statutes. 
3. The Argument from Semantic Skepticism and Common Law Belief.—
A competing approach reverses these premises about interpretation and law, 
but only to reach the same conclusion that a state court’s common law 
powers do not create divergence from interpretation in the federal context. 
First, the theorist will reject the notion that the interpreter’s perception 
of clear semantic meaning or intent is separable from the statute or the legal 
system’s background purposes.  The theorist sides with Fuller in his debate 
with Hart about language and interpretation.244  The answers for both “easy” 
and “hard” questions about “vehicles in the park” turn on an understanding 
of nonsemantic norms existing above or behind the words on the page.  
Answering a “hard” case is not an act of legislative discretion, but a 
disciplined practice with an inevitable appeal to nonsemantic matters like 
history, purpose, and moral principle.245  An “easy” case, by contrast, only 
appears to be so because of a close fit between the semantic meaning and the 
background norms.246  Second, this approach would also reject the 
understanding of common law as a system of posited rules.  I call this 
common law “belief” because it accepts in some form the traditional 
common lawyers’ argument that the rules and principles announced in 
judicial decisions and legal treatises are merely evidence of the common law 
on a question, which in fact exists independent of those texts.247  In this 
respect, Dworkin’s claim that law is not just a system of rules and his 
competing interpretive theory of law as integrity cast him as a descendant of 
the common law tradition.248 
This framework regards the language of both statutes and precedent as 
signs pointing the interpreter to the reasoned purpose that is in fact the law.  
Such regard for legislation resembles the classical common lawyers’ 
treatment of statutes as well as Ronald Dworkin’s purposive approach to 
 
244. Fuller, supra note 214, at 663–66.  One can also see this premise in the statutory 
pragmatist’s claim that it is impossible for interpreters to limit themselves to purely semantic 
sources when constructing the meaning of statutes.  See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 139, at 
353–54 (describing the “funnel of abstraction,” wherein the interpreter looks at a broad range of 
evidence which may support or contradict any particular meaning or understanding). 
245. See DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 352 (arguing that when general principles of society 
conflict with the language of a statute, that statute may be unclear). 
246. See id. at 353 (asserting that easy questions of law arise when general societal principles 
align with the statutory language). 
247. See Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 596 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) 
(“Classical common law jurisprudence resolutely resisted the theoretical pressure to identify law 
with canonically formulated, discrete rules of law.”). 
248. See Mark D. Walters, Legal Humanism and Law-As-Integrity, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 352, 
353, 363–64  (2008) (drawing parallels between Dworkin’s thought and common law “humanists” 
like John Dodderidge and Francis Bacon); see also Goldsworthy, supra note 125, at 231–32 
(echoing Walters’s parallels with regards to Sir Edward Coke). 
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statutory interpretation.249  This convergence also sounds in the calls of 
Roscoe Pound, James Landis, and Justice Stone for courts to use statutes as 
sources of fresh principles for the development of common law.250  To be 
sure, classical common lawyers embraced supra-textual interpretation to 
integrate statutes into the superior common law, whereas twentieth-century 
jurists hoped progressive statutory principles would supplant the retrograde 
obscurities of their Blackstonian inheritance.251  In both modes, however, 
judges have oracular power, whether by expounding the reason of judge-
made law or principles immanent in legislation. 
This second approach is the mirror image of the framework discussed 
above.  It denies both the separation of semantic meaning from background 
purpose and the hard positivist understanding of common law and statute.  
Like its converse, it too collapses the distinction between common law and 
statute, though here it assimilates both into a model of law and legal 
reasoning reminiscent of nonpositivist common law theory.  Its concept of 
“interpretation” is as capacious as its counterpart is narrow, so it 
emphatically maintains that broadening, narrowing, or extending statutes in 
common law fashion is in fact a matter of interpretation.  Judge Kaye 
gestures at this approach, notwithstanding her concession to legislative 
supremacy.  She claims the common law is derived “from human wisdom 
collected . . . over countless generations to form a stable body of rules”252 and 
denies any “sharp break” in the statutory and precedential reasoning, for 
“there remains at the core the same common-law process of discerning and 
applying the purpose of the law.”253  Other arguments in favor of treating 
statutes like precedents have gestured at a similar interchangeability between 
the two modes of law, with a similarly central role for the jurist.254 
 
249. See Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B.) 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b (announcing 
that statutes shall be interpreted in light of the mischief they sought to remedy); DWORKIN, supra 
note 229, at 337 (contending that statutes must be read in a way that best interprets the legislative 
purpose as a whole). 
250. See James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL 
ESSAYS 213, 215 (1934) (discussing judges’ use of the doctrine of equity to conform statutes to 
generally recognized aims of the law); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. 
REV. 605, 614 (1908) (acknowledging that common law has failed to properly address certain 
modern issues and should draw on legislation for fresh principles of growth); Harlan F. Stone, The 
Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12–14 (1936) (describing the treatment of 
statutes as sources of law which judicial decisions can extend). 
251. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century 
Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1734–35 (1993). 
252. Kaye, supra note 43, at 5. 
253. Id. at 25. 
254. See generally Traynor, Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 405, 425 (comparing the 
similarities between judicial interpretation of statutes and judicial interpretation of common law); 
Robert F. Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 544, 556 (1982) (arguing that, because the underlying statutory policy likely 
has significance beyond its text, courts should use statutes as persuasive authority in cases where the 
statute does not apply directly). 
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Yet under this approach, the case for state–federal divergence is perhaps 
even weaker than under assumptions of semantic belief and common law 
skepticism.  If statutory interpretation proceeds in the fashion of precedential 
reasoning, and if common law reasoning in the absence of statutes is not a 
form of judicial legislation, then a state court’s apparently distinguishing 
feature of common law powers turns out to be redundant to the claim of 
interpretive freedom.  Strongly purposive or dynamic reading of statutes 
follows irrespective of whether a court had jurisdiction over common law 
causes of action.  An absence of general common law authority matters only 
if one conceives of common law powers as authority for judicial 
legislation—a premise this framework rejects.  In this light, Dworkin’s 
interchangeable treatment of statutory interpretation in the New York Court 
of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court is a logical outgrowth of his vision 
of law and interpretation, not an oversight.255  Both state and federal courts, 
from this perspective, should reject textualism for the same reasons. 
IV. A Tentative Case for Divergence 
Parts II and III provide and apply frameworks for considering the 
difference common law powers may make for state interpretive method 
compared to that of the federal courts.  A satisfactory resolution of the 
preliminary arguments for and against divergence will require more work 
than has been expended thus far.  Nevertheless, this Part offers a tentative 
proposal that attempts to account for and reconcile the competing 
constitutional, institutional, and conceptual claims concerning the effect of 
state courts’ common law powers on statutory interpretation.  This proposal 
suggests that while constitutional concerns may preclude state courts from 
narrowing the semantic meaning of a statute to fit its background purpose, 
these courts retain discretion to extend a statute beyond its linguistic scope in 
pursuit of the statute’s purpose or broader coherence in the legal fabric.  This 
approach mirrors neither federal textualism nor its purposive or dynamic 
rivals, but it does account for aspects of state court interpretation that existing 
commentary cannot explain. 
A. The Proposed Hybrid Model and Its Assumptions 
Recalling the federal context will help to understand this argument for 
state court divergence in interpretation.  As Professor Manning argues, the 
dividing line between federal textualism and purposivism is the choice 
between a statute’s semantic meaning and its background purpose when the 
two conflict.256  Semantic meaning and purpose can conflict in two ways.  A 
 
255. See DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 15–23 (comparing a New York Court of Appeals’ 
decision that relied heavily on the legislative purpose of a wills statute with a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision based on a literalist reading of the statute in question). 
256. Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 76. 
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statute’s semantic meaning may be overinclusive, covering matters not 
within the statute’s apparent purpose.  Or the semantic scope may be 
underinclusive, such that it does not extend to matters that, in light of 
statutory purpose and policy, ideally should be covered. 
The federal textualist would stick to semantic meaning in cases of 
overinclusion and underinclusion.  The federal purposivist, by contrast, 
would privilege purpose in both circumstances.  My argument is that a 
court’s general common law powers open a third path.  Under this approach, 
courts with these powers should refuse to narrow the semantic scope of a 
statute—in short, be “textualist” on semantic overbreadth—but retain 
discretion to broaden a statute’s coverage beyond its semantic borders—to be 
“purposive” or arguably even “dynamic” on semantic underbreadth.  Here, 
courts regard the legal landscape as a tract of common law that the legislature 
has a plenary right to displace or develop through statutes—or to create new 
“tracts” of law where no common law had before existed.  The legislature 
can preempt judicial development of the law but, absent affirmative indicia 
to the contrary, legislative inaction permits activity by courts, including 
extension of rules and principles originating in legislation.  In this respect, 
the relationship between the state courts and the state legislature would 
resemble that between federal courts and Congress in the context of enclaves 
of federal common law or the federal courts’ inherent, defeasible powers to 
make procedural rules, though the conceded nature of state courts’ common 
law powers would lessen concerns about the constitutional source of such 
judicial authority.257 
For similar reasons, a state court’s common law powers may also 
suggest a different approach to vague or ambiguous statutes.  If internal 
“gaps” in a statute do not displace the common law backdrop, a court 
interpreting a vague statute might not be required to estimate legislative 
intent or purpose in filling out the details.  Comity, statutory coherence, and 
judicial humility may recommend faithful agency, but in the common law 
zone other considerations legitimately compete with those reasons.  With this 
sketch in mind, a return to the criteria of interpretive choice will help in 
understanding and evaluating this tentative proposal. 
1. Constitutional Inferences.—In line with federal textualism, this 
approach prohibits a state court from narrowing the ordinary meaning of a 
statute to avoid an awkward application or to preserve common law 
prerogative.  This limit on purposive or equitable interpretation follows from 
constitutional norms of legislative supremacy and separation of powers 
discussed above.  Common law is defeasible law that must yield when 
 
257. For an example of a textualist identifying and providing an originalist justification for 
federal courts’ inherent powers to craft procedural common law, see generally Amy Coney Barrett, 
Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008). 
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statutory law covers a particular point of decision.258  A similar conclusion 
follows from constitutional norms respecting legislative compromise.  In 
systems with bicameralism and presentment and other vetogates, the means a 
legislature chooses to accomplish an end are as important as the goal itself.  
Judicial fine-tuning would upset those compromises.  This result, it seems, 
can pertain whether we think of “common law” as positivist judicial 
legislation or in the nonpositivist terms of custom or reason.  Statutes are 
jurisprudentially “solid” such that common law reasoning cannot justifiably 
chip away at their scope. 
It is less clear, by contrast, that legislative supremacy and compromise 
prohibit judicial extension or supplementation of statutes by common law 
courts.  The question is what default rule common law courts should use in 
cases of legislative silence.  Does a statute’s treatment of matter x in a 
situation preclude a court from treating analogous matter y the same way in 
the same situation?259  For federal textualists, the answer is yes, in part to 
protect legislative compromise as discussed above.260  But even those 
textualists will allow common law-like development when the legislature 
delegates such authority to courts.261  This affirmative requirement of 
legislative delegation—and the corresponding negative inference from 
silence on judicial lawmaking—fall away when the legal backdrop assumes 
an interpreter with general, defeasible power to develop law where the 
legislature has not.  In this context, silence alone is insufficient to raise the 
federal textualist’s negative inference, though statutory text or other 
constitutional norms may do so expressly or through strong implication.262 
This approach respects and reflects many differences between state and 
federal constitutions in terms of structure and lawmaking authority.  State 
constitutions give courts more substantive lawmaking powers than their 
federal counterparts while embracing structural norms of separation of 
powers and legislative supremacy that are stricter than those contemplated by 
Madison.263  These features of state separation of powers push in opposite 
 
258. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 888. 
259. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 405 (seeming to answer “yes” by 
arguing that judges can reason by analogy to extend the application of a statute to a circumstance 
not covered by its plain meaning). 
260. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 109 (suggesting that unless the statute clearly gives 
courts the power to develop interstitial common law, judges should restrict the statute to situations 
clearly anticipated by its framers as expressed in the legislative process). 
261. Id. at 544–45. 
262. For example, statutory language indicating a legislative remedy was exclusive would 
prohibit extension, and due process notice norms would likely prohibit the purposive extension of 
criminal statutes. 
263. Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 313 (observing that because “state constitutions are 
different in a number of ways from the more-familiar federal Constitution . . . judicial interpretation 
of state constitutions can be quite different”); see also G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and 
State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 841, 857–58 (1991) (exploring how state 
constitutional interpretation may differ). 
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directions, but the hybrid approach respects both the judicial prerogative and 
legislative supremacy. 
Overall, this approach resembles the arrangement arising in England 
with the ascent of Parliament, the separation of the courts from the Crown, 
and the consequent waning of equitable interpretation.  There, too, common 
law courts, operating in the shadow of a supreme parliament, privileged text 
in statutory interpretation while assuming that common law governed on all 
matters of legislation left uncovered.264  This approach continued into the 
twentieth century, with courts respecting legislation overturning particular 
decisions, while still treating the underlying principles as valid in other 
doctrinal pockets not addressed by the statute.265  A similar approach was 
arguably held in Australia prior to the legislative codification of purposive 
interpretation.266  Under their pre-statutory “common law” of interpretation, 
Australian courts would rely on purpose only when the text was ambiguous 
or inconsistent.267  These commonwealth courts differed from my tentative 
proposal, however, in their hesitance to apply statutory rules beyond their 
scope and the courts’ proclivity for overly narrow reading of statutes.268  
These practices, however, seem as much a product of distaste for statutes as 
respect for the legislature.  Common law courts could give statutes 
“reasonable” rather than “strict” constructions269 while also realizing that a 
legislature’s failure to address one matter by statute does not always preclude 
a court from addressing it on its own.  The familial resemblance between the 
proposed approach and English or Australian practice may not be a 
constitutional coincidence.  Like state courts, the highest courts of appeal in 
commonwealth nations like the United Kingdom and Australia traditionally 
had to reconcile their undisputedly general common law powers with a 
system of legislative supremacy. 
2. Institutional Competence.—Considerations of institutional compe-
tence suggest one threshold qualification to the hybrid model proposed 
above.  When a statute addresses a subject not traditionally covered by the 
common law, courts should be more concerned about exercising their 
 
264. See Baade, supra note 121, at 90–91 (discussing the interplay between rules of statutory 
construction and the common law). 
265. See P.S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 MOD. L. REV. 1, 12 (1985) (noting that 
courts tend to view the legislative reversal of judicial decisions as “not affecting the underlying 
principles of those decisions”). 
266. See D.C. PEARCE & R.S. GEDDES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN AUSTRALIA 24–30 
(5th ed. 2001) (discussing codified methodology). 
267. Id. at 22 (citing Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214, 235 (Austl.)).  Australian courts 
traditionally allowed departure from text in cases of absurdity, although this exception appeared to 
be limited to drafting mistakes.  See id. at 21–22. 
268. See Atiyah, supra note 265, at 8–9 (observing the historical reluctance of British courts to 
fill in statutory gaps). 
269. Cf. Scalia, supra note 142, at 23 (differentiating between reasonable textualism and strict 
constructionism). 
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inherent constitutional authority to extend statutory scope.  The metaphor 
about statutes displacing a common law backdrop arguably breaks down 
when the legislature breaks new ground and, for example, enacts a 
comprehensive scheme regulating public utilities.  At that point, judicial 
prudence may prioritize the search for legislative intent.270 
Setting this qualifier aside, advocates of strong-form textualism or 
purposivism on institutional grounds are likely to be unhappy with this 
hybrid model.  For them, there is no obvious reason why courts are more 
likely to be better or worse at discerning historical intent or purpose, 
identifying existing preferences, or making good policy when they extend 
rather than narrow the linguistic scope of a statute.271  In that light, my 
tentative proposal is an arbitrary half measure in the eyes of institutional 
purists of all stripes.  It is fair to ask whether considerations of institutional 
competence do any work in this model. 
Against claims of across-the-board purposivism on institutional 
grounds, this model reflects an admittedly controversial prioritization of 
constitutional norms and structures over concerns for institutional 
competence.  Even if courts are good at narrowing statutes to fit background 
purposes, constitutional inferences limiting what courts can do with statutes 
when the legislature has issued authoritative text may preclude this appeal to 
expediency.  Such institutional considerations, however, could be germane 
when a legislature instructs or permits the court to consider purpose across 
the board, a point I bracket given the constitutional disputes surrounding 
such legislation.272 
The answer to the institutional textualist must be different, for the 
proposed model presumes that extension of statutes is generally within 
constitutional bounds.  Accordingly, any limits here will turn on prudential 
decisions in which competence considerations play a central role.  I can only 
sketch the beginning of a response here, but it seems much will turn on the 
subject matter of the statute.  As noted, in areas where a statute 
comprehensively supplants the common law or resolves problems 
 
270. This is not to say such statutes completely displace the common law.  For example, even 
complex regulatory regimes governing power rates will require courts to repair to common law 
principles governing contracts.  See Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 811 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (giving deference to the agency’s interpretation of a 
contract when the issue is the simple construction of language); Pojanowski, supra note 205, at 
808–09 (noting the difficulty that arises when common law rules are ambiguous and reviewing 
courts must decide between the agency’s interpretation and the court’s). 
271. One may argue extension is less risky as a matter of policy because the legislature has 
chosen to act and selected the policy vehicle that the court applies elsewhere.  That argument falsely 
presumes that using a good tool more often will lead to better solutions.  More pulleying will not get 
the job done when you need a block and tackle. 
272. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2004) (instructing courts to engage in 
purposive interpretation of unambiguous statutes); Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1771 
(cataloging state courts’ resistance to legislation governing interpretive method); Manning, 
Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 19, at 2441–45 (arguing that federal legislation requiring the 
absurdity doctrine would be unconstitutional self-delegation by the legislature). 
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surrounded by little common law precedent, hesitancy to expand statutory 
scope is understandable.  Where a statute touches on or mingles with 
common law doctrine, such a presumption makes less sense.  This occurs not 
only because a court’s grasp of a statute’s legal and practical context may 
improve its search for intent, purpose, current preferences, or good policy.273  
State courts are also better positioned to cultivate coherence where common 
law and statute overlap.  The legislature’s presumptive awareness of existing 
law may be a benevolent fiction in statutory interpretation, but it reflects the 
reality of a court approaching legislation interwoven with a broader body of 
common law.  Courts are thus well positioned to decide whether it makes 
sense to extend a statute’s scope in the name of coherence and consistency 
with existing common law.274 
3. Common Law and Concepts of Legal Interpretation.—At the 
threshold, this proposal assumes the cogency of meaningfully separating 
expressed semantic meaning from background purpose.  This assumption is 
controversial and its full defense is the work of a productive scholarly career, 
not the subsection of an article.  Nevertheless, the rise of textualism in state 
court jurisprudence that Professor Gluck chronicles suggests that many 
common law jurists share this assumption with the increasingly textualist 
Supreme Court of the United States.275 
A theorist who limits the concept of interpretation to understanding 
semantic meaning or intent of a text will also object that extension of a 
statute beyond its linguistic scope is not an act of “interpretation,” but is 
rather legislation or something else.276  For my purposes, little turns on the 
label.  The primary inquiry here is whether a court should be allowed to 
narrow or extend the semantic scope of a statute, whatever you may call such 
tailoring.  As a person with a restrictive understanding of “interpretation” 
would agree, this question concerns matters of constitutional law or practical 
consequences, not a debate about the definition of interpretation.277 
This proposal is also agnostic about the nature of the common law.  It is 
amenable to one who thinks of common law precedent as a form of posited 
law crafted by judges and defeasible by legislation.278  It is also amenable to 
 
273. Compare supra section II(C)(2), with subpart III(B). 
274. See, e.g., Traynor, Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 417–18 (discussing the example 
of In re Mason’s Estate, 397 P.2d 1005 (Cal. 1965), involving the California Supreme Court’s 
analogical extension of a probate code provision to a similar instance in the common law of 
guardianship not covered by statute). 
275. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1775–811. 
276. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 96, at 98–99 (arguing that courts move beyond the 
realm of interpretation when they decline to follow statutory language). 
277. Perhaps the danger of infelicitously labeling an activity “interpretation” is to load the 
rhetorical dice in favor of legitimacy.  Judges are on safer ground if they are “interpreting” statutes 
than when they are making law or consulting the brooding omnipresence. 
278. To believe this, one need not hold that common law is strictly analogous to legislation.  
See John Gardner, Some Types of Law, in COMMON LAW THEORY, supra note 125, at 51, 67–71 
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one who views the common law as a body of custom or principle that is 
distinct from legislative-type rules.  One only needs to concede that common 
law, whatever its nature, must yield on matters that statutes expressly 
resolve.  In other words, constitutional norms (and perhaps by extension 
nonposited norms of political morality) can require preexisting, nonposited 
common law to yield to authoritative legislative commands. 
That said, there is an appealing jurisprudential ambidexterity in this 
model absent in other approaches that either understand all forms of law and 
interpretation in the statutory positivist idiom or submerge both statutes and 
precedent in a framework of purposive or moral reading.  It permits an 
interpreter to embrace a principle-based theory of common law that does not 
reduce adjudication to interstitial legislation while also treating statutes in the 
fashion of posited rules that preempt judicial judgment with their scope.  This 
dualist understanding of law’s domains coheres with the intuitions of many 
thoughtful lawyers, including jurists in commonwealth countries who must 
integrate general common law powers with legislative supremacy.279  Nor, 
more importantly, is it unprecedented in American jurisdictions that 
recognize general common law.280  The intersection of two such domains 
marks a plausible point of differentiation for state and federal interpretation, 
and while negotiating this overlap poses challenges, theoretical complexity is 
not always a sign of error. 
B. Explaining State Practice 
This proposed model, however tentative, advances inquiry and 
understanding in the developing field of state statutory interpretation.  This 
Article’s work on the effect of common law powers explains features of state 
jurisprudence that existing scholarship does not.  This is particularly so 
regarding one of Professor Gluck’s most significant contributions—her 
identification of a state court interpretative method she calls “modified 
textualism.”281  In these “modified textualist” jurisdictions, one finds courts 
flouting textualism (modified or otherwise) in a manner Gluck has not 
 
(arguing that although case law constitutes positive law, it differs from legislation because it is not 
expressly made and is the work of an individual agent, not an institutionalized group). 
279. See, e.g., Brennan v Comcare (1994) 50 FCR 555, 572 (Austl.) (“The judicial technique 
involved in constructing a statutory text is different from that required in applying previous 
decisions expounding the common law.”). 
280. As Professor Nelson explains, in the pre-Erie era, federal courts sitting in diversity would 
exercise independent judgment on matters of general law but not on state court interpretations of 
statutes.  This deference extended to state legislation codifying or displacing what was previously 
within the realm of general law.  See Nelson, supra note 242, at 3–4.  To this date, Georgia still 
treats common law in the manner of Swift v. Tyson.  See Green, supra note 98, at 1134–35.  Even if 
Georgia is an outlier, Professor Green notes how the choice-of-law rules in every state today are 
Swift-ian in character.  See id. at 1162–67.  Nor do state courts appear to conceive of federal 
common law in terms of post-Erie positivism.  See Bellia, supra note 67, at 1540–41. 
281. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1758. 
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identified,282 namely at the crucial intersection of common law and statutes.  
This Article’s proposed model explains these deviations from textualism and 
provides a fuller understanding of state courts’ treatment of statutes. 
Under Gluck’s “modified textualism,” a court first considers statutory 
text, second considers legislative history, and third looks to background 
norms.  Because such courts only take incremental steps when an earlier one 
does not decide the question, they resolve many cases on textualist grounds 
alone.283  The model for “modified textualism” is the three-step inquiry the 
Oregon Supreme Court announced in PGE v. Bureau of Labor & 
Industries.284  Gluck argues that this new approach is textualist, 
notwithstanding its use of legislative history.285  Moreover, because it 
restricts the use of substantive canons like the absurdity doctrine, Gluck 
argues that the method can be more textualist than federal approaches, which 
allow for such correction.286 
But even textualists with tolerance for legislative history may raise their 
eyebrows when they look closer at the law in “modified textualist” 
jurisdictions.  Consider the Supreme Court of Oregon’s decision in Scovill v. 
City of Astoria.287  There, a woman’s estate sued the city, claiming that its 
police department’s failure to follow a statute requiring the officers to take 
her to a detoxification facility caused her death.288  Invoking PGE, the city 
moved to dismiss because the statute provided no explicit private right of 
action or enforcement provision of any kind.289  This strategy was 
understandable: the primacy of text over background norms in PGE 
recommends a similar refusal to supply a private right of action in statutory 
silence.290  Hornbook textualism, at least in federal scholarship, holds that a 
legislative choice about textual means—here, no private right of action—
 
282. Gluck anticipates criticism from orthodox textualists regarding modified textualists’ use of 
legislative history.  Id. at 1758–59.  This is not my concern and the “modified textualist” practice of 
using legislative history parallels the moderate use of such sources in federal practice.  See 
Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 12, at 1288 (noting the “longstanding practice of using 
unenacted legislative history as authoritative evidence”). 
283. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1836–37. 
284. 859 P.2d 1143, 1146–47 (Or. 1993); see Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation 
Methodology as “Law”: Oregon’s Path-Breaking Interpretive Framework and Its Lesson for the 
Nation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539, 540–41 (2011) (explaining the significance of the new test). 
285. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1834–35. 
286. See id. at 1758–59, 1851–52 (discussing modified textualism and federal courts’ lack of a 
consistent methodological approach in use of substantive canons). 
287. 921 P.2d 1312 (Or. 1996). 
288. Id. at 1314. 
289. Id. at 1318. 
290. Compare J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (holding courts should provide 
remedies to promote legislative purpose), with Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) 
(“We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our search for Congress’s intent [to provide a 
private remedy] with the text and structure of Title VI.”). 
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shows how the legislature values a goal vis-à-vis other considerations.291  
One would think “modified textualism” step one—taking clear text as broad 
or as narrow as drafted—would respect this choice. 
Nevertheless, the Scovill court rejected the city’s argument, but not 
because it rejected PGE and not because the statute’s text and history were 
unclear enough to allow purposive interpretation.  Instead, the court deemed 
PGE irrelevant because its framework concerned statutory interpretation, 
“not a change in substantive tort law.”292  Under tort law, Scovill explained, a 
court decides whether to create a private right of action for a statutory 
violation.293  The court concluded that a tort action would promote the 
legislative purpose, particularly because the statute “does not specify other 
means for its enforcement.”294  Despite Oregon’s purportedly textualist 
methodology and despite the plaintiff’s reliance on a statute, the court 
invoked its inherent common law power to supply a remedy in the absence of 
an explicit prohibition. 
Scovill is not an outlier.  Consider the tort doctrine of negligence per se.  
There, a court uses a statutory rule to define the breach element in a 
negligence claim.  This common law practice, which is embraced by the 
majority of jurisdictions, three of Gluck’s four “modified textualist” states, 
and the current Restatement of Torts, looks puzzling through federal 
textualist eyes.  A legislator willing to criminalize conduct at the cost of a 
minor fine may feel differently about a plaintiff using the statute to collect a 
substantial tort judgment.295  Thus, the first problem for a textualist is the 
court’s decision that the statute is relevant at all given the absence of any 
private right of action.  This is similar to the worry the textualist has about 
Scovill, as evidenced by the Third Restatement’s recognition that negligence 
per se “reduces the significance” of inquiries about “implied statutory 
cause[s] of action.”296 
 
291. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 109, at 546 (arguing that courts should respect the 
particular means legislatures have chosen to pursue a given goal). 
292. Scovill, 921 P.2d at 1318 n.8. 
293. Id. at 1318; see also id. at 1319 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. 
c (1979)) (explaining that courts may create a tort remedy if doing so is “in furtherance of the 
purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision”). 
294. Id. at 1319. 
295. This worry is not new.  See Charles L.B. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal 
Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361, 364 (1932) (“[I]t savors of absurdity to impute to the legislature 
an intention to create a civil liability, where it has manifested no intention of creating a civil 
remedy.”). 
296. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. b 
(2010); accord Lowndes, supra note 295, at 365 (“The difference between [the approaches of 
negligence per se and an implied cause of action] in a given case may be one of technique rather 
than result . . . .”); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence 
of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 865 n.19 (1996) (“Although . . . 
negligence per se . . . is not the same as an implied cause of action . . . the two claims get the 
plaintiff to the same place.”). 
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A court that decides the statute is in play—textualist departure number 
one—then affirms a second textualist heresy: a purposive inquiry asking 
(a) whether the statute protects a defined class of people; (b) whether the 
plaintiff is in the protected class of people; (c) whether the injury was the 
kind of injury contemplated by the statute; and (d) whether the injury 
occurred in the way contemplated by the statute.297  The resemblance to the 
“mischief rule” of purposive interpretation is unmistakable.298  The fact that 
the proper-class and proper-injury tests are functional equivalents to the duty 
and proximate cause elements of the negligence tort further demonstrates that 
the court’s primary concern is not the statute’s semantic meaning. 
From the perspective of orthodox textualism, both decisions (i) to create 
or infer from silence a private right to enforce a regulatory statute and (ii) to 
mold the scope of the statute in common law fashion are problematic.  One 
can make similar arguments regarding state courts’ treatment of statutes in 
other common law doctrines, such as the rule voiding the entirety of an 
otherwise valid contract if one term requires a party to violate a statute.299  
Oregon courts use the PGE method to determine if the contract calls for a 
statutory violation, but do not pause to ask whether the statute permits its use 
in such a broad fashion.300  This juxtaposition of modern textualism with a 
classical common law extension of statutes301 suggests that state court 
textualism is more modified than Gluck’s work suggests. 
Under the hybrid parliamentary/common law method of interpretation 
proposed here, however, the judicial supplementation of statutes in the face 
of silence that flouts federal textualism may be legitimate for state courts.  
Recall that one claimed difference that common law powers make is 
disabling the federal textualist’s default rule against judicial lawmaking when 
a statute is silent about a matter within its orbit.302  When the legislative 
backdrop encompasses common law courts, the potential “domain” of the 
statute may expand through judicial action absent contrary indicia in 
 
297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14, § 14 
cmt. f (2010). 
298. See Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B.) 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b (announcing 
the mischief rule). 
299. See, e.g., Staffordshire Invs., Inc. v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 149 P.3d 150, 
156–57 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the PGE approach in the illegal contract context). 
300. Id. at 157 (citing PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1146–47 (Or. 1993)). 
301. Id. at 156–57 (analyzing enforceability of contract under Uhlmann v. Kin Daw, 193 P. 435 
(Or. 1920)). 
302. See Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se: 
What’s the Difference?, 77 OR. L. REV. 497, 514–15 (1998) (criticizing Scovill for failing to 
acknowledge that the court, not the legislature, created the tort action); cf. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1916) (citing 1 Comyn’s Digest tit. (F)) (allowing a private damages 
suit for a violation of the federal act “according to a doctrine of the common law . . . .  Ubi jus ibi 
remedium”); Harvey S. Perlman, Thoughts on the Role of Legislation in Tort Cases, 36 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 813, 834 (2000) (“The early common-law rule that every right deserves a 
remedy was not based on a finding of legislative intent; it was a common-law rule even when 
applied to protect a right created by statute.”). 
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legislative text.  For this reason, Ezra Ripley Thayer, the early twentieth-
century tort theorist and son of noted constitutional formalist James Bradley 
Thayer, accepted the doctrine of negligence per se even though as a matter of 
statutory interpretation he was inclined to draw negative inferences from 
statutory omission of remedies.303 
Now compare this judicial freedom in broadening statutes with the 
hybrid model’s prohibition, articulated above, on common law courts 
narrowing statutes.  We can now see why Oregon’s PGE methodology 
allows for actions like judicial creation of private remedies or contract 
voidance while also joining academic textualists in rejecting the absurdity 
doctrine.  The difference common law powers make dissolves this apparent 
tension in “modified” textualism and offers a more complete picture of state 
court interpretation.  This framework’s ability to explain Oregon’s 
textualist/common law hybrid suggests that the structural differences 
between federal and state court textualism are even more significant than 
Gluck’s work appreciates.304 
C. Avenues for Further Inquiry 
The preceding discussion argues that a court’s inherent common law 
authority may sanction some departure from federal textualism, but it does 
not necessarily entail the wholesale purposivism advanced by federal 
scholars and some of their state counterparts.  Actual state court practice, 
moreover, supports these theoretical arguments and in turn appears more 
comprehensible in light of these insights.  At the very least, this analysis 
suggests caution before assuming that federal and state interpretive methods 
must walk in lockstep.  Nor should advocates of interpretive divergence 
assume that the menu of options available to state courts is the same as those 
available to federal courts.  That said, this model and its assumptions require 
further consideration, elaboration, and defense.  A complete answer will 
depend on how the questioner regards the institutional, constitutional, and 
jurisprudential variables in interpretive choice—as well as the subquestions 
under each category.  The remainder of this Part flags further lines of inquiry 
on state court interpretation arising from this Article’s contribution so far. 
First, the three-part framework in Part III can aid comparative analysis 
beyond the particular matter of common law powers.  This analytical 
framework separates interpretive choice along three axes: constitutional, 
 
303. See Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 320 
(1914).  Thayer’s work on negligence per se and remedies anticipates by seventy years arguments 
offered by textualists like Judge Easterbrook.  See id. (“Proper regard for the legislature includes the 
duty both to give full effect to its expressed purpose, and also to go no further. . . .  Its omission [of 
a civil remedy] must therefore be treated as the deliberate choice of the legislature, and the court has 
no right to disregard it.”). 
304. See Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1858–61 (noting differences between state and 
federal courts but arguing that federal law and scholarship can nevertheless draw broader lessons 
from state practice). 
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institutional, and conceptual criteria.  Different theorists will include, 
exclude, and prioritize the three criteria differently, but considering those 
aspects directly can clarify these commitments and help indicate whether, 
why, and how a particular difference between court systems could translate 
into a different approach to statutes.  In the state–federal context, for 
example, this framework can structure many inquiries, whether the points of 
differences concern methods of judicial selection,305 judicial background, 
caseload and subject matter, or judges’ quasi-legislative or executive duties.  
Accordingly, the work thus far has sought not only to build and apply a 
comparative framework for evaluating common law difference, but also to 
offer an analytical structure for an emerging yet undertheorized area of 
inquiry.  Nor is its payoff limited to state–federal comparisons.  The 
framework can also clarify questions of interpretive divergence within a 
given legal system306 and between nations. 
This latter point brings us to the second line of further inquiry, which 
flows from the recognition that interpretive theory concerning state courts 
may profit more from increased focus on the high courts of our 
commonwealth cousins and less on the U.S. Supreme Court.  Although 
questions about the nature and extent of general federal common law powers 
may make reliance on the interpretive practice of commonwealth courts 
controversial, for state courts, the constitutional analogy is cleaner.  As 
noted, both state and many commonwealth courts retain inherent common 
law powers despite the presence of a legislature supreme in its ability to 
trump judge-made law.  In this respect, a rich vein of decisional law and 
scholarship sits unmined by American scholars. 
That said, scholars and jurists interested in pursuing this line should 
note that the contextual translation may not be seamless.  American states 
have written constitutions with judicially enforceable limits on legislative 
power.  The United Kingdom famously does not,307 leading many jurists 
there to regard the common law as the guarantor of rights.  Thus, 
parliamentary supremacy has long dueled with a tradition of unwritten 
constitutionalism rooted in the common law.308  Common law 
constitutionalism may partially explain these high courts’ stinting 
construction of statutes even after parliamentary supremacy.309  This faith in 
common law reason may also drive the broadly purposive statutory 
 
305. See generally Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79. 
306. See generally Bruhl, supra note 5 (comparing federal district and appellate courts). 
307. But see Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3, 8 (U.K.) (providing a judicial remedy for 
violations of the European Convention of Human Rights and requiring judges to interpret statutes, 
to the extent possible, to be compatible with the convention). 
308. For a helpful overview of current debates on common law constitutionalism in the United 
Kingdom, see Thomas Poole, Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law 
Constitutionalism, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (2003). 
309. See Baade, supra note 121, at 90–91 (discussing how acts of Parliament that changed the 
common law became interpreted restrictively and led to an era of strict construction). 
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interpretation advocated by contemporary common law constitutionalists.310  
To the extent that the impulse to privilege common law is a substitute for 
written constitutional rights—as opposed to a thesis about the nature of the 
judicial function—this strand of thought may have less relevance to statutory 
interpretation in American states. 
A closer analogue may lie even farther abroad.  The High Court of 
Australia authoritatively interprets the nation’s statutes and promotes and 
develops a unified, national system of common law.311  Australia’s 
“Washminster” form of government, which combines a written constitution 
and bicameralism with a parliamentary government,312 suggests further 
parallels with American state constitutional structure.313  Furthermore, as in 
many American states, the Australian parliament has partially codified a 
preferred method for statutory interpretation.314  Unlike in many American 
states, the High Court also appears to take these statutes seriously.315  Thus, 
while much federal jurisprudence on the relationship between statutes and 
common law debates the latter’s legitimacy, Australian jurists are free to 
probe the deeper questions without threshold doubts about the enterprise.316  
Whatever the other differences in constitutional contexts, these more detailed 
Australian discussions seem more promising for a state judge than, say, 
arguments about Erie’s implications for federal common law. 
In that vein, for state courts seeking federal guidance on statutory 
interpretation, particularly at the intersection of the common law, the most 
promising sources likely predate Erie and the lessons the Supreme Court has 
drawn from it in the past thirty years.  For example, a state court’s approach 
to the intersection of tort law and statutes might properly resemble the 
 
310. See, e.g., T.R.S. Allan, Text, Context, and Constitution: The Common Law as Public 
Reason, in COMMON LAW THEORY, supra note 125, at 190 (“The better attainment of the statute’s 
general purposes is a good reason for its extension to the doubtful case.”). 
311. See JAMES CRAWFORD & BRIAN OPESKIN, AUSTRALIAN COURTS OF LAW 196–97 (4th ed. 
1996) (detailing the Australian High Court’s functions as a final appellate court). 
312. See, e.g., Elaine Thompson, The Constitution and the Australian System of Limited 
Government, Responsible Government and Representative Democracy: Revisiting the Washminster 
Mutation, 24 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 657, 657–58 (2001) (outlining the structure of the Australian 
government).  Despite Australia’s federal system, its High Court is more analogous to state supreme 
courts than to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Commonwealth’s integrated judicial system makes the 
High Court the court of final appeal for both federal and state questions.  See CRAWFORD & 
OPESKIN, supra note 311, at 42 (outlining the Australian High Court’s appellate jurisdiction). 
313. American state governments are not parliamentary, as the executive branch is separate 
from the legislature.  Nevertheless, state governments traditionally have had strong legislatures and 
weak or fragmented executives.  WILLIAMS, supra note 129, at 247, 303. 
314. See Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (Austl.) (giving preference to 
interpretations that “best achieve the purpose or object of the Act”); id. s 15AB (codifying the 
permitted use and sources of legislative history). 
315. See PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note 266, at 25–28, 63 (describing the High Court’s 
implementation of its provisions); cf. Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 6, at 1755–56, 1785–98 
(describing state court resistance to codified methods of statutory interpretation). 
316. See, e.g., Brennan v Comcare (1994) 122 ALR 555, 572 (Austl.) (analyzing the 
differences between interpreting statutes and common law precedents). 
2013] Statutes in Common Law Courts 535 
 
 
federal inquiry on private rights of action prior to the advent of increased 
restrictions.317  Before then, the absence of an express provision of any right 
of private enforcement was not enough to stay the court’s common law 
powers.318  Nor did a court supplying a private action always understand its 
act as implementing legislative intent.319  By contrast, courts would not 
recognize private rights when statutory text, fairly read, contradicted such a 
right or suggested a right would disturb a legislative scheme.320  It is telling 
that this approach thrived in federal courts before Erie,321 which challenged 
the legitimacy of federal common law and undermined this more liberal 
approach to private rights of action.322 
One final point in further need of exploration is precisely how to 
negotiate the overlap between preexisting common law doctrine and 
legislation.  The Article’s proposal treats the state legal landscape as a tract 
of common law that the legislature has a plenary right to displace or modify 
through statutes.  Assuming statutes can displace common law, the most 
challenging questions concern the borderland of a statute’s domain.  This 
Article presents an approach analogous to “conflict preemption” in federal 
law, allowing judicial development of law adjacent to legislation so long as 
the two are not in direct conflict.323  Federal textualist assumptions, by 
contrast, would require a model akin to “field” or “obstacle” preemption in 
federal law: once a statute touches on a subject, concerns of institutional 
competence or constitutional compromise militate against extending the 
statute’s norms beyond its semantic scope or otherwise supplementing the 
regime in common law fashion.324 
The presence of common law powers softens the constitutional case for 
a broader preemptive approach in the state context, but does not settle the 
 
317. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291–93 (2001) (denying private right of action 
absent explicit textual provision). 
318. See H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private 
Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 548 (1986) (stating that “[t]he 
plaintiff was entitled to an adequate remedy for legal wrongs, including wrongs defined by 
legislation”). 
319. Id. 
320. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 426 (1964) (“Federal courts will provide 
the remedies required to carry out the congressional purpose of protecting federal rights.”). 
321. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1916) (allowing for a private 
right of action because it was clearly implied in the context of the intended legislative scheme). 
322. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (“‘Raising up causes of action where a statute has not 
created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
323. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260 (2000) (stating that state law is 
only preempted when it “contradicts a rule validly established by federal law”); cf. Williams, supra 
note 254, at 554, 563 (arguing that a statute’s failure to cover an area should not raise a “negative 
preemption” inference concerning common law extension of that statute by analogy). 
324. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424–25 (2003) (invoking the doctrine of 
“obstacle” preemption to override state law which frustrates, but does not formally conflict with, 
federal law or policy); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (discussing the doctrine of 
field preemption). 
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issue.  A particular theory about the nature of certain common law doctrines, 
for example, may decide the practical wisdom of allowing judicial 
elaboration in the statutory periphery.  If, as many contend or assume, private 
law subjects like torts, contracts, or property are merely “public law in 
disguise,”325 the institutional competence objections to judicial 
supplementation of legislative policy through case-by-case adjudication 
could be substantial.326  By contrast, if there is warrant for the traditional 
conception of private law as reasonably autonomous from public law, 
internally coherent, and normatively appealing—points reasserted by a 
number of recent theorists327—the case against displacing swaths of common 
law by negative implication is stronger.  Ironically, it is private-law 
instrumentalists who have argued for broad judicial license with respect to 
legislation,328 while those who defend the autonomy of private law have 
shown little theoretical interest in statutes.329  The strongest case against 
broad statutory preemption of common law will need to attract the attention 
and draw on the resources of the right private law theorists. 
V. Looking Beyond State Courts 
A. Federal Courts 
This Article’s first contribution to federal interpretation is its suggestion 
that the relationship between textualism, purposivism, and the common law 
is more complex than those debates often assume.  In the federal context, 
skepticism of federal common law runs in tandem with misgivings about 
 
325. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1959); see also 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 71–72 (1972) (arguing that the 
purpose of tort law is to create incentives for efficient precaution); Fleming James, Jr., Tort Law in 
Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BUFF. L. REV. 315, 334–37 (1959) 
(encouraging tort doctrine to spread the cost of accidents through enterprise liability). 
326. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 148, at 886 (arguing that statutory interpretation 
would be aided by a closer examination of institutional capacities and dynamic effects). 
327. See generally WEINRIB, supra note 168, at 206 (arguing that private law is autonomous 
because of the self-regulative nature of its immanent rationality); Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights 
Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873, 1873–74 (2011) (arguing that private law is 
best understood as a means for individuals to exercise their moral enforcement rights); John C.P. 
Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1661 (2012) 
(rejecting the theory that the norms of private law reduce to norms of public law). 
328. Compare Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle, supra note 240, at 751 (“[Judging entails] the 
recurring choice of one policy over another [in the formulation of new rules].”), with Traynor, 
Statutes Revolving, supra note 120, at 401–03 (arguing for judicial freedom to narrow and extend 
statutes in light of common sense and sound policy); see also Robert E. Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and 
Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 19 (1978) (arguing for policy-oriented interpretation of 
statutes intersecting with tort law). 
329. Professor Zipursky, however, recently has demonstrated how non-instrumental private law 
theory can shed light on public law questions concerning constitutional limits on punitive damages 
and federal preemption of state law.  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and 
Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757 (2012). 
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purposivism.330  By contrast, belief in broad federal common law powers 
often runs with purposivist or dynamic interpretation.331  The shared premise 
upon which these factions differ is that a grant of common law powers is an 
on–off switch between thoroughgoing purposivism and formalist approaches 
like textualism.  Yet some plausible institutional or jurisprudential 
approaches discussed in Part III indicate that the connection between 
common law powers and purposive interpretation may be fragile or 
contingent.  Indeed, given the tendency for many purposivist or dynamic 
theorists to blur the lines between interpretation of precedent and 
interpretation of statutes, a grant of common law powers may be redundant in 
the argument against textualist interpretation.  Even if common law powers 
do make some difference, the proposal in subpart IV(A) also underlines how 
they may not entail thoroughgoing purposivism.  A court’s defeasible 
authority to make law on its own may be irrelevant when a superior legislator 
has spoken clearly.  Accordingly, broad common law powers may only give 
federal courts the ability to extend a statute’s coverage in the face of silence, 
and not the ability to contradict clear text.  This is more than an orthodox 
federal textualist would allow, but less than a purposivist or dynamic 
interpreter would seek. 
Second, this Article’s analysis may inform federal courts’ approach to 
statutes that intersect with federal common law.  In particular, courts could 
modulate their approach depending on whether they are operating in a 
traditional enclave of residual common law powers—such as admiralty or 
interstate disputes—or making interstitial common law to protect federal 
interests.332  Even for an orthodox federal textualist, subpart IV(A)’s pro-
posed approach for state courts could apply for statutes intersecting with 
traditional enclaves, while the usual textualist worries about federal common 
lawmaking would pertain in the interstitial setting.333 
 
330. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 113, at 352 n.92 (critiquing expansive approaches to federal 
common law that “would provide virtually no constraint on federal judicial lawmaking” and would 
impose “little more than a pleading barrier before federal courts could take off on an unguided 
exercise formulating new rules of decision based on perceptions of utility”); Martin H. Redish, 
Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” 
Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 768–69 (1989) (critiquing judicial policy choices where a 
legislature has already indicated its own choice on the same subject). 
331. See, e.g., Field, supra note 140, at 317 (arguing that the creation of federal common law 
does not violate separation of powers principles); Weinberg, supra note 140, at 846–47 (celebrating 
living common law as “more closely in touch with the current political will than is the dead hand of 
an old code”). 
332. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (holding that in 
such cases, it “is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own 
standards” in the absence of statutes). 
333. This analysis would be similarly applicable to questions at the intersection of legislated 
rules of procedure and federal courts’ inherent powers to craft procedural common law.  See 
generally Barrett, supra note 257 (describing the procedural common law powers of federal courts). 
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We can understand this point by examining two controversial federal 
common law cases.  In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,334 the Supreme 
Court modified its common law of admiralty to allow for a wrongful death 
action.335  It did so in part to advance what it saw as a congressional policy in 
favor of such recoveries, as evidenced by federal legislation on maritime 
accidents that concededly did not govern the case.336  Even Judge Posner, an 
avowed purposivist, has criticized Moragne’s modification of the common 
law for functionally amending the relevant legislation and making it harder 
for Congress to strike legislative bargains on maritime legislation in the 
future.337  Next, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,338 the Court crafted a 
federal common law defense for military contractors facing state tort suits for 
injuries caused by allegedly defective products sold to the government.339  
There could be no liability when the equipment conformed to government-
approved specifications and the supplier warned the government of known 
risks.340  This defense for contractors was necessary, Boyle explained, in part 
to protect a federal interest, namely the government’s “discretionary 
function” statutory defense to negligence claims under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.341  Dissenters and commentators criticized this holding on 
separation of powers grounds, arguing that the Court created a defense where 
the statutory text plainly had not.342 
From the perspective of federal separation of powers textualism, both 
decisions are problematic.  Moragne’s revision of maritime doctrine 
effectively expanded the scope of the Death on the High Seas Act and Boyle 
preempted state law because a dispute between two private parties might 
indirectly frustrate the aims of a government immunity statute not involved in 
the litigation.  The proposed approach for state courts in subpart IV(A), 
however, suggests that criticism of Moragne is misplaced.  Residual pockets 
of common law, like admiralty law, resemble state court realities more than 
the post-Erie federal universe of limited jurisdiction.  For this reason, 
Moragne’s development of admiralty law to reflect the Court’s—and 
Congress’s—preferred policy on wrongful death suits is no more problematic 
 
334. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
335. Id. at 409. 
336. Id. at 408–09. 
337. Posner, supra note 156, at 203. 
338. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
339. Id. at 511–12. 
340. Id. at 512. 
341. Id. at 511; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
342. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515–16, 526–29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
took on a legislative role when it created the government contractor defense in disregard of 
Congress’s prior refusal to create a similar defense); see also Larry J. Gusman, Note, Rethinking 
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. Government Contractor Defense: Judicial Preemption of the 
Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 395 (1990) (asserting that the Court, in 
barring recovery for individuals harmed by a product designed by a government contractor, 
“functioned as the writer of laws, rather than the interpreter of laws”). 
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than, for example, negligence per se in state courts.  Given the Court’s 
defeasible power to make maritime law, Congress’s silence in this enclave of 
common law does not raise the negative inference it might in the run-of-the-
mill federal setting.  Matters appear differently outside of residual enclaves, 
leaving Boyle and other attempts to protect federal interests still vulnerable to 
the separation of powers criticism that the courts leaped from statutory 
interpretation to illicit statutory extension.343 
B. Intersystemic Interpretation 
Comparative statutory interpretation raises the question—posed by 
Gluck in recent work on state–federal statutory interpretation—of whether a 
court interpreting a statute from another jurisdiction should follow the 
interpretive method of the other jurisdiction’s courts.344  According to Gluck, 
this question also requires us to ask whether statutory interpretive 
methodology is “law.”345  Gluck answers both questions in the affirmative, 
pointing to (1) state courts’ regard of their own interpretive methods as 
binding, (2) analogies to law governing other kinds of “interpretation,” and 
(3) the post-Erie, positivist understanding of law.346  The three-pronged 
analysis of interpretive choice described in Part III indicates that the answers 
to these questions turn on one’s criteria for interpretive choice.  In short, 
Gluck’s answers may or may not be correct, but we cannot know without 
further inquiry. 
For the institutional interpreter, wondering whether interpretation is 
“law” is not a particularly helpful exercise.  Whatever “law” is, the central 
question is what approach to intersystemic interpretation fits the competences 
of the interpreter.  For example, an institutionalist may conclude that a state 
court should be purposivist in interpreting state statutes and that a federal 
court should be textualist in interpreting federal statutes.347  The analysis may 
further suggest, however, that a federal court’s institutional limits are such 
that adopting the state court’s purposivist stance in diversity cases may do 
more harm than good.348 
Similar caution may also apply to interpretation across states lines.  
Institutional analysis could indicate that courts in State A should read 
State A’s statutes purposively, that courts in State B should read State B’s 
statutes purposively, but that courts in State A and State B may best promote 
relevant values by reading each other’s statutes through a textualist lens.  Or, 
 
343. Cf. Merrill, supra note 113, at 347 (“The use of federal common law in admiralty cases 
and interstate disputes is harder to reconcile with an anti-prerogative framework.”). 
344. Gluck, Intersystemic, supra note 9, at 1903. 
345. Id. at 1902. 
346. Id. at 1972, 1976–77, 1988–89. 
347. Cf. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 148, at 928 (suggesting that institutional 
considerations can illustrate why certain entities, such as agencies, should be either bound to a 
textualist approach to statutory interpretation or given the authority to abandon textualism). 
348. VERMEULE, supra note 112, at 282–83. 
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as Bruhl and Leib have suggested, given the empirical uncertainty and the 
decision costs of trying to resolve this question, courts may be better off not 
even asking whether interpretive method should travel with the statute.349  
Under institutional analysis, the intersystemic decision is contingent on facts 
and capacities, which possibly does not allow for any ready, global solution. 
Although constitutional regimes are also contingent, the constitutions 
that the federal government and the states already have may lead to a more 
fixed approach to methodological translation.  Beyond the requirements that 
states have a republican form of government and forbid bills of attainder, the 
federal Constitution has little to say about particular separation of powers 
arrangements in the states.  Constitutional values of federalism and state 
sovereignty, then, could suggest that federal courts should strive to apply 
state methodology in diversity cases, just as they would strive to follow the 
dictates of other forms of state law.350  This appears to be so even if it 
requires federal courts to apply to state statutes methods that would violate 
federal separation of powers if applied to federal law.  If a federal court can 
sometimes hear a case that would be justiciable under state, but not federal, 
law,351 perhaps it can also apply interpretive methods derived from other 
constitutions.  Thus, if the “law” of statutory interpretation is a refraction of 
constitutional law, federal courts under our constitutional order may have an 
obligation to respect methodological differences. 
Finally, the intersystemic question may turn on the theorist’s standpoint 
regarding the nature of interpretation and law.  Echoing Gluck’s approach, an 
interpreter who understands all law as posited law can treat another 
jurisdiction’s interpretive method as binding doctrine that supervenes upon 
substantive rules of decision.352  By contrast, a theorist like Dworkin may 
argue that a faithful interpreter has no choice but to read any statute in light 
of background purposes and the best reading of that community’s principles 
of political morality.353  Or, following Alexander, the theorist may limit 
“interpretation” to identifying legislative intent.  If that task is harder for a 
 
349. See Bruhl & Leib, supra note 79, at 1269 (“[T]hese challenging questions may very well 
generate good reasons to reject interpretive divergence.”); Bruhl, supra note 5, at 494–95 (noting 
that differences in competence can militate against adoption of methodology across systems). 
350. Gluck, Intersystemic, supra note 9, at 1990–91 (arguing that state and federal courts 
should engage in a “dialectical federalism” for statutory interpretation). 
351. Cf. Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623–24 (1989) (applying Arizona standing 
principles to hear a controversy even if it would have been nonjusticiable under federal justiciability 
doctrine). 
352. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 112–13 
(“Substance and process are intimately related.  The procedures one uses determine how much 
substance is achieved, and by whom.  Procedural rules usually are just a measure of how much the 
substantive entitlements are worth, of what we are willing to sacrifice to see a given goal 
attained.”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2085, 2108 (2002) (“Interpretive rules are substantive law, and they go hand in hand with the 
substantive statutes of the legislatures that create them.”). 
353. DWORKIN, supra note 229, at 87–88. 
2013] Statutes in Common Law Courts 541 
 
 
court to do from afar, the court will have to engage in more guesswork, or 
lawmaking and less interpretation.  But the “interpretation” portion of 
decision making will be the same in substance—the distance works a 
difference of degree, not kind.  Despite their differences, Alexander and 
Dworkin would agree that jurisdictional boundaries are irrelevant to the 
nature of interpretation.  For them, treating interpretive method as “law” in 
the post-Erie sense is like trying to promulgate binding rules of grammar and 
syntax, or to amend our background principles of political morality.  It is to 
take a metaphor too far. 
In sum, the framework deployed in this Article suggests that the answer 
to the question of whether interpretive methodology is statute-trailing “law” 
turns on what you mean by “law.”  The answer varies depending on whether 
we conceive of the law of statutory interpretation as the product of pragmatic 
considerations, constitutional law, the concept of legal interpretation itself, or 
some combination of the three.  Or perhaps this broader inquiry—
identifying, prioritizing, or reconciling these three aspects—is itself the 
“law” of statutory interpretation.354  Given this complexity within and among 
these aspects of interpretive choice, we should not be surprised that we find 
confusion and inconsistency in the courts’ approaches to interpretation across 
legal systems.  Appreciating this dynamic may be the beginning of wisdom. 
Conclusion 
A good way to gain new appreciation of your first language is to learn a 
second one.  A good way to find something you have misplaced is to stand 
on a chair and view the room from another angle.  Working through the 
interpretive implications of differences between state and federal courts is 
important in its own right.  In doing so, we also rotate a crystal whose 
refractions cast federal and general interpretation in a different light.  At a 
time when debate regarding interpretation in the federal context seems 
locked at a stalemate, fresh perspective is all the more welcome.  This Article 
helps discern the effects of common law powers on a court’s treatment of 
statutes, while also advancing the theory of intersystemic interpretation.  It is 
not the last word on either, but it points the way forward to an improved 
understanding of state, federal, and general interpretation alike. 
 
354. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 8 (1983) (“The law contains within itself a legal science, a meta-law, by which it 
can be both analyzed and evaluated.”). 
